225 A.3d 224
R.I.2020Background
- In 2010 the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation guaranteed $75 million in bonds for 38 Studios; the company collapsed in 2012 and taxpayers faced roughly an $88 million liability.
- A statewide grand jury convened in 2012, sat ~18 months, and completed its work in 2015; the Attorney General announced no provable criminal violations arising from the funding and disbursement associated with 38 Studios.
- Separate civil suits recovered over $61 million and produced hundreds of thousands of documents made public.
- In February 2017 Governor Raimondo filed a Superior Court petition seeking public release of “all 38 Studios grand jury records.”
- The Presiding Justice denied the petition: (1) the Governor did not seek disclosure under Superior Court Crim. P. 6(e), the rule governing grand-jury secrecy; and (2) alternatively, the Governor failed to show particularized need and policy factors did not favor disclosure. The Governor appealed.
- The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding the Superior Court lacks inherent authority to order public disclosure beyond the exceptions in Rule 6(e); it also noted that, even if inherent authority existed, the petition would have been denied on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Superior Court has inherent authority to disclose grand-jury materials outside Rule 6(e) | Governor: Court has supervisory "inherent authority" to release materials in exceptional circumstances; Rule 6(e) exceptions are permissive, not exclusive | AG: Rule 6(e) and statutes are exhaustive; Superior Court cannot override the rule by inherent authority | Held: No—Superior Court has no inherent authority to disclose beyond Rule 6(e); it derives power from statutes and rules |
| Standing to seek public disclosure | Governor: As statewide executive and budget-maker (paying debt) she has a unique injury; alternatively as a member of the public she may seek access | AG: The Governor alleges generalized public interest, not a particularized injury; public disclosure request undermines standing | Held: Court concluded Governor lacked traditional standing but exercised discretion to reach the merits due to substantial public interest |
| Whether "special/exceptional circumstances" justified disclosure | Governor: Exceptional circumstances (public interest, widespread civil discovery) outweigh secrecy | AG: No special circumstances; disclosure would harm witnesses, potential targets, and ongoing law-enforcement interests | Held: Even assuming inherent authority, the Governor failed to show special/exceptional circumstances; timing and scope weighed against disclosure |
| Whether Superior Court erred by applying particularized-need test and policy factors | Governor: Particularized-need test applies only to Rule 6(e) motions; Presiding Justice improperly used it and abused discretion on policy factors | AG: Application was appropriate as an alternative basis to deny disclosure; policy factors support secrecy | Held: Court did not need to reach these errors after resolving inherent-authority question but observed Presiding Justice would not have abused discretion in denying release |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (establishes grand jury’s role in charging and protecting against unfounded accusations)
- United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (discusses grand-jury functions and limits on disclosure)
- Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (addresses judicial discretion and Rule 6 secrecy)
- United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (comments on trial-court discretion over grand-jury testimony use)
- In re Doe, 717 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 1998) (Rhode Island recognition of grand-jury secrecy as rule but not absolute)
- In re Young, 755 A.2d 842 (R.I. 2000) (Rhode Island case treating disclosure under Rule 6(e) exceptions)
- State v. Ouimette, 298 A.2d 124 (R.I. 1972) (earlier R.I. authority recognizing limited discretion to disclose for judicial proceedings)
- Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2016) (federal panel allowing historical disclosure based on petitioner’s particularized interest)
- In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997) (factors to evaluate special/exceptional circumstances for disclosure)
- McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding federal courts lack inherent authority to disclose records outside Rule 6(e))
