in Interest of J.D, 2020 CO 48

J.D., a juvenile, pled guilty to third-degree trespass in a deferred-adjudication agreement before a juvenile magistrate; deferral included conditions and a $25,647.06 restitution order.
Plea counsel failed to timely object to the restitution order; J.D. moved to withdraw his guilty plea under Crim. P. 32(d).
At a hearing the magistrate granted the motion after plea counsel conceded he had mistakenly believed his representation had ended.
The People petitioned for review to the district court, which ruled the magistrate lacked jurisdiction (finding the restitution condition finalized sentencing), voided the magistrate’s withdrawal order, reinstated the deferred adjudication, and allowed J.D. to seek relief via a nunc pro tunc petition to the district court.
The court of appeals reversed, holding the magistrate had jurisdiction to decide the Crim. P. 32(d) motion because it was not a review of a prior magistrate order and implicated matters outside the record.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals (on different grounds): magistrates may revisit rulings before a final order; a guilty plea prior to sentencing in a deferred adjudication is not a final judgment; therefore the magistrate had jurisdiction to grant the motion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a juvenile magistrate had jurisdiction to grant J.D.'s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw a guilty plea after restitution was imposed as a condition of deferred adjudication	Magistrate lacked jurisdiction because imposition of restitution finalized sentencing and only a judge could revisit the plea	Magistrate had jurisdiction because the motion was part of the delinquency case the magistrate was appointed to hear and did not seek review of a final magistrate order	Court held magistrates may revisit rulings until proceedings culminate in a final order; a guilty plea before sentencing in a deferred adjudication is not final, so the magistrate had jurisdiction
Whether the juvenile’s sole remedy was a nunc pro tunc petition for reinstatement of review rights to the district court	District court: magistrate’s order was void and J.D.’s only remedy was a nunc pro tunc petition to the judge	J.D.: he could seek presentence relief under Crim. P. 32(d) before sentencing from the magistrate who heard the case	Court rejected the district court’s remedy limitation and affirmed that Crim. P. 32(d) relief before entry of final judgment was available to J.D.

Kazadi v. People, 291 P.3d 16 (Colo. 2012) (deferred judgment is not a final judgment; Crim. P. 32(d) can be used pre-sentencing)
Ellsworth v. People, 987 P.2d 264 (Colo. 1999) (no final conviction until sentence is imposed)
People v. Carbajal, 198 P.3d 102 (Colo. 2008) (deferred judgment not final until revoked)
People v. Widhalm, 642 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1982) (deferred judgment is not a conviction and allows withdrawal of plea)
People v. Owens, 228 P.3d 969 (Colo. 2010) (statutory interpretation principles govern meaning of legislative language)
Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C. v. Flood, 278 P.3d 348 (Colo. 2012) (rules are interpreted in light of drafting conventions and broader scheme)
People ex rel. Gallagher v. Dist. Court, 666 P.2d 550 (Colo. 1983) (describes law-of-the-case and trial-court reconsideration as discretionary)
BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson, 185 P.3d 811 (Colo. 2008) (in pari materia construction of related statutory provisions)
Martinez v. People, 69 P.3d 1029 (Colo. 2003) (presumption of consistency across statutory scheme)
People v. Morehead, 442 P.3d 413 (Colo. 2019) (discussion of law-of-the-case and trial court reconsideration)