In Interest Of B.T.B.
436 P.3d 206
| Utah Ct. App. | 2018Background
- Mother petitioned in juvenile court (March 2017) to terminate Father's parental rights to two children; Father did not contest statutory grounds (abandonment/neglect/token efforts) but opposed termination as not in children's best interests.
- Father had sporadic contact since divorce, multiple incarcerations related to drug offenses, and no child support payments; children remained in Mother's custody and never in State custody.
- Juvenile court found statutory grounds and concluded termination was in the children’s best interest, separately finding termination was "strictly necessary" despite no pending adoption.
- Father appealed, arguing (1) the phrase "strictly necessary" creates a distinct third statutory element requiring a showing that termination was needed to free children for adoption, and (2) even if subsumed in best interest, the juvenile court erred in applying the standard.
- The Court of Appeals concluded the term "strictly necessary" must be read into the best-interest analysis (not as a separate element), disavowed the court’s prior “almost automatically” line of cases that collapsed best-interest into statutory grounds, vacated the termination order, and remanded for reconsideration applying the clarified test.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effect of "strictly necessary" in Utah Code § 78A-6-507(1) | Mother: it is part of best-interest inquiry; termination permitted when necessary | Father: it creates a separate third element requiring necessity (e.g., to enable adoption) | Court: "strictly necessary" is substantive but should be analyzed as part of the second (best-interest) prong, not a standalone third prong |
| Whether termination can be "strictly necessary" absent a pending adoption | Mother: lack of adoption is a factor but not dispositive | Father: termination can never be strictly necessary unless it frees child for adoption or similar permanency plan | Held: Adoption status is only one factor; termination can be strictly necessary without a pending adoption in some extreme cases |
| Proper role of the best-interest prong vis-à-vis statutory grounds | Mother/guardian ad litem relied on appellate line saying termination "almost automatically" follows from grounds | Father: best-interest must be independently proved; statutory change reinforces rigor | Held: Court disavowed the "almost automatically" line; best-interest must be an independent, thorough inquiry including whether less drastic alternatives exist |
| Burden of proof on best-interest element | Mother: when grounds proven, best-interest often follows | Father: petitioner must prove best-interest by clear and convincing evidence; parent should not be forced to show the case is "rare" | Held: Petitioner retains burden to prove best-interest by clear and convincing evidence; prior appellate cases that shifted this burden were disavowed |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (1997) (parental right to rear children is a fundamental liberty interest)
- In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) (statutory grounds and best-interest are distinct; cannot terminate solely on best-interest)
- In re T.E., 266 P.3d 739 (Utah 2011) (two-part test: statutory grounds plus best-interest; clear-and-convincing standard)
- In re A.M.O., 332 P.3d 372 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (trial court denied termination for lack of best-interest proof; appellate treatment criticized here for relying on "almost automatically")
- In re G.J.C., 379 P.3d 58 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) (example of appellate decisions concluding best-interest "follows almost automatically" from grounds; disavowed)
- In re R.A.J., 991 P.2d 1118 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (rejected presumption that best-interest follows from statutory grounds)