T1 R.O. (Stepmother) appeals the district court's order denying her petition to terminate the parental rights of M.M. (Mother) and dismissing Stepmother's petition for the adoption of A.M.O. (Child). Stepmother argues that the district court's findings of fact are insufficiently detailed. We agree and reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
12 Stepmother is married to Child's biological father (Father). Since 2008, Mother, who is Child's biological mother, and Father have shared legal custody of Child, but Father has retained physical custody of Child. Mother has a history of substance abuse, and in November 2010, she was arrested and incarcerated for drug-related offenses.
{3 In May 2011, Stepmother filed a petition for adoption, in which she sought to terminate Mother's parental rights and to become Child's adoptive parent. On May 18, 2011, Mother was served with notice of the adoption proceeding. The notice informed Mother that she had thirty days to file a response if she intended to intervene in or contest the adoption. Mother's pro se Motion to Extend Time for Answer was filed in district court on June 20, 2011.
14 The district court held evidentiary hearings in 2012 and announced its findings of fact and rulings from the bench. In evaluating a petition to terminate parental rights, the court engages in a two-step analysis. The first step requires the court to determine whether the petitioner demonstrated grounds to terminate parental rights. In re Adoption of T.H.,
15 At this point, the district court explained that the burden shifted to Mother to demonstrate that during that period of time
T 6 The district court then turned to evaluating the second step involved in a petition to terminate parental rights; whether it would be in Child's best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights. See In re Adoption of T.H.,
T7 Thereafter, the district court entered a short written order denying Stepmother's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights, dismissing Stepmother's petition to adopt, and noting that it had made its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. Stepmother subsequently filed a motion to amend and for a new trial, arguing that the district court did not make adequate findings regarding Child's best interest and that the court did not state the standard it was using for evaluating best interest. Mother did not file a memorandum in opposition. Nevertheless, the district court denied Stepmother's motion to amend and "[stood] by the findings and conclusions previously made, based on the evidence presented in the hearings." Stepmother now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
18 On appeal, Stepmother contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to strike Mother's pleadings.
19 Stepmother also argues that the district court did not enter findings sufficient to support its conclusion that it was not in Child's best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights. "We review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for correctness as a question of law." Jacobsen v. Jacobsen,
ANALYSIS
I Motion to Strike
110 Stepmother argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to strike Mother's pleadings. According to Stepmother, Mother was required by statute to file a motion to intervene within thirty days after receiving notice of the adoption proceeding. Stepmother further contends that by failing to file a motion to intervene within that time frame, Mother forfeited her parental rights to Child.
{11 In support of her argument that Mother forfeited her parental rights, Stepmother relies on section T8B-6-110 of the Utah Adoption Act. Subsection (6)(a) of this section explains, "A person who has been served with notice of an adoption proceeding and who wishes to contest the adoption shall file a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding: (i) within 30 days after the day on which the person was served with notice of the adoption proceeding...." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-110(6)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). This section further provides,
A person who fails to fully and strictly comply with all of the requirements de-seribed in Subsection (6)(a) within 30 days after the day on which the person was served with notice of the adoption proceeding:
(i) waives any right to further notice in connection with the adoption;
(forfeits all rights in relation to the adoptee; and
(ii) is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert any interest in the adoptee.
Id. § 78B-6-110(6)(b). On appeal, Stepmother asserts that because Mother received notice of the adoption proceeding on May 18, 2011, Mother's motion to extend, which was filed more than thirty days later on June 20, 2011, was untimely. Stepmother argues that Mother's late filing constitutes a "fail{lure] to fully and strictly comply" with the requirements of subsection (6)(a) and that Mother has therefore "forfeit[ed] all rights in relation to [Child]." See id.
112 "As an appellate court, our power of review is strictly limited to the record presented on appeal. Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." Gorostieta v. Parkinson,
113 Here, Stepmother has not carried her burden to ensure the record is adequate for review because she has provided us only with the minute entry of the district court's order that she claims is in error. This minute entry simply states that Stepmother's motion to strike Mother's responses is denied and does not indicate the grounds for the court's order. Stepmother has failed to include the transcript of the motion hearing in the record on appeal. Without a tran-seript of the hearing during which the court considered and ruled on Stepmother's motion, we have no way to ascertain the district court's basis for its ruling, especially in light of the concise nature of the district court's minute entry. See Summer v. Summer,
T 14 Due to Stepmother's failure to provide an adequate record on appeal, we do not reach the merits of her argument regarding the statutory requirements under the Utah Adoption Act. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Stepmother's motion to strike.
II. Findings on Best Interest
{15 Stepmother challenges the district court's determination that termination of Mother's rights was not in Child's best interest. Specifically, Stepmother argues that after having found grounds for termination, the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact on the issue of whether termination of Mother's parental rights would be in Child's best interest.
[ 16 In order to terminate parental rights, the court must make two separate findings supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re Adoption of T.H.,
117 "(Iln every case, the best interest of the child is of paramount importance in determining whether the child-parent relationship should be permanently severed." In re J.D.,
(a) the physical, mental, or emotional condition and needs of the child and his desires regarding the termination, if the court determines he is of sufficient capacity to express his desires; and
(b) the effort the parent ... [has] made to adjust [her] cireamstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child's best interest to return him to his home after a reasonable length of time, including ...
(i) payment of a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and maintenance, if financially able;
(ii) maintenance of regular parent-time or other contact with the child ...; and
(iii) maintenance of regular contact and communication with the custodian of the child.
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509(1) (LexisNexis 2012). Further, "the court may also consider any other evidence that is probative of what is in the child's best interest." In re T.E.,
{18 Although we have "recognize[d] that only rarely will a child's best interests not be served by terminating the rights of an unfit parent," In re D.R.A,
%19 In considering whether to terminate parental rights-and to permit meaningful appellate review of the court's ultimate determination-the district court's findings "must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon which they are grounded." In re S.T.,
120 "[Als a practical matter, where grounds for termination are established, the conclusion that termination will be in the child[ J's best interest follows almost automatically." In re J.D.,
1 21 In this case, we agree with Stepmother that the district court's best interest analysis is not sufficiently detailed. Notwithstanding the district court's stated intent to resolve "whether given all of the facts and cireumstances(, termination] is in [Child's] best interest," the district court's analysis does not indicate which particular facts and cireumstances it relied upon in reaching its conclusion that terminating Mother's rights would not be in Child's best interest. Rather, the district court's best interest analysis is conclusory and does not incorporate an on-the-record consideration of the statutory factors involved in conducting a best interest analysis. For instance, the district court stated that it heard no evidence regarding Child's wishes or the nature of his understanding of his relationship with Mother, but the court otherwise did not address Child's "physical, mental, or emotional condition."
T22 Without more detailed findings, we cannot discern the basis for the conclusion that this is one of those rare cases where termination is not in the best interest of the child despite the existence of grounds for termination.
CONCLUSION
1 23 We affirm the district court's denial of Stepmother's motion to strike Mother's pleadings because Stepmother has not presented an adequate record on appeal to permit us to consider this issue on the merits. The district court's findings regarding Child's best interest are not sufficiently detailed. We therefore reverse the district court's order denying the petition to terminate and remand for further consideration and the entry of adequately detailed findings.
Notes
. Mother was still in jail at the time. Mother's motion to extend was not filed in the district court until June 20, 2011, but she mailed her motion to extend from jail on June 15, 2011.
. Where no changes material to our analysis have occurred, we cite the most recent version of the Utah Code Annotated.
. Indeed, there is no dispute that Mother has not seen Child since August 2010.
. Mother did not take the opportunity to file a brief in this court. As a consequence, we have considered this matter on Stepmother's brief alone.
. Following the filing of Mother's answer and motion to intervene, Stepmother filed a second motion to strike Mother's responses and a motion to terminate parental rights on a summary basis. As with her first motion to strike, Stepmother cited section 78B-6-110 of the Utah Adoption Act. But in contrast to her first motion to strike, Stepmother's second motion to strike argued that Mother's answer and motion to intervene did not comply with the court's prior order, which had denied Stepmother's first motion to strike and which had given Mother ten days to file an answer. The district court denied both of Stepmother's motions. The transcript from the hearing during which the district court ruled on Stepmother's second motion to strike is in the record on appeal. However, on appeal, Stepmother does not effectively challenge the district court's ruling on her second motion to strike. Instead, Stepmother's argument on appeal focuses on the issue presented in her first motion to strike: whether Mother's motion to extend complied with statutory requirements. As we have explained, Stepmother has not presented an adequate record for us to review the court's ruling on that issue.
. We also note that Stepmother argued to the district court that termination would be in Child's best interest especially if Father were to have an untimely death. In that event, Child would be returned to Mother, his surviving parent, even though the district court had adjudicated the existence of grounds for termination of Mother's rights. Stepmother also argued that Child would be returned to Mother in the event that Father, a member of the United States Army Reserve, was deployed. The district court did not make any findings relating to this argument, even though Father's potential deployment would appear to be relevant to the issue of Child's best interest.