Imani v. Pollard, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11299

Imani was charged with armed robbery and felon-in-possession in Wisconsin; fingerprints and a driver ID linked him to the crime; his co-defendant testified against him.
After the trial court denied a suppression motion, Imani invoked his Faretta right to represent himself, citing dissatisfaction with counsel’s handling of the suppression hearing and investigation.
The trial judge refused to permit self-representation, questioning Imani’s education, trial experience, and the timing relative to the trial schedule; Imani was tried with counsel and convicted.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals ordered a new trial for failure to perform the full Klessig colloquy; the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, finding Imani did not deliberately choose to proceed pro se and was not competent to do so.
The federal district court found the state trial court may have violated Faretta but denied habeas relief; this Court reversed, holding the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent and granted habeas relief (release or new trial).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court shifted burden to defendant to show waiver was knowing and voluntary	Imani: Court must ensure waiver is knowing/voluntary; defendant need not prove it	State: Court may deny pro se if record doesn't show knowing/voluntary choice	Court: State erred; burden is on the court to establish waiver, not the defendant (Faretta)
Whether judge may deny self-representation because defendant’s reason is rash or unsatisfactory	Imani: Defendant’s subjective reasons immaterial; choice must be honored even if foolish	State: Request was episodic/frustration-driven, not deliberate	Court: Denial for lack of a judge-approved reason is contrary to Faretta; bad reasons do not justify denial
Proper competence standard for pro se representation	Imani: Competence standard limited; only severe mental incapacity may bar self-representation (Edwards)	State: Higher competence required (practical trial experience, schedule concerns)	Court: Wisconsin applied an impermissibly high competence standard; no evidence of severe mental illness; decision contrary to Faretta/Edwards
Whether trial scheduling and timing justified denial	Imani: Request was made weeks before trial and he said no delay needed; timing alone insufficient	State: Scheduling and preparation burdens justified denial	Court: Scheduling concerns do not equate to incompetence; denial weeks before trial violated Faretta

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has Sixth Amendment right to self-representation; court must ensure waiver is knowing and voluntary)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (limits on court-appointed standby counsel and harmless-error note re denial of self-representation)
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (states may deny pro se rights to defendants with severe mental illness lacking capacity to conduct trial)
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (trial courts must warn defendants of hazards to establish knowing waiver)
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (states may adopt more elaborate competency standards for certain contexts)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference: state-court rulings must be unreasonable, not merely incorrect, to warrant habeas relief)
Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005) (definition of "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" under AEDPA)
Brooks v. McCaughtry, 380 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 2004) (contrast case where denial was affirmed due to disruptive behavior and incapacity)