Ilyas Khrapunov v. Pavel Prosyankin, 931 F.3d 922

Background

Khrapunov, a party in English litigation involving alleged misappropriation of BTA Bank funds, applied under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the Northern District of California for a subpoena to Google seeking subscriber information to support efforts to discharge an English worldwide asset-freeze order and a cross-examination order.
A magistrate judge granted the § 1782 application and issued a subpoena; objectors (Prosyankin and John Doe) moved to quash; the magistrate narrowed but did not quash entirely.
The district court upheld the magistrate judge’s ruling; objectors appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
While the appeal was pending, English courts denied Khrapunov’s applications to discharge the two interlocutory orders and denied permission to appeal; at least one English judge characterized Khrapunov’s arguments as meritless.
The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded, directing the district court to reassess on remand (1) whether § 1782’s statutory requirements (especially that discovery be “for use in a proceeding in a foreign tribunal”) remain satisfied given developments in England and (2) whether, in the court’s discretion, discovery remains appropriate.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mootness / Article III jurisdiction	Khrapunov: case not moot; discovery could still be effectual because English proceedings are ongoing and evidence might support reopening.	Objectors: English courts’ final denials make the § 1782 request no longer "for use" in a foreign proceeding, rendering the matter moot.	Majority: Objectors did not meet heavy burden of mootness; but factual developments require remand to reassess statutory elements and discretion.
§ 1782 “for use in a proceeding” when foreign proceedings have concluded	Khrapunov: may reopen or seek permission to reopen if new evidence is found; discovery could aid that.	Objectors: reopening is not realistically available; Euromepa bars discovery to justify reopening completed proceedings.	Majority: Euromepa principles still relevant; district court must fact-find whether discovery would meaningfully relate to reopening and satisfy "reasonable contemplation" standard from Intel.
Discretionary Intel factors (receptivity / character of foreign proceedings)	Khrapunov: English courts might consider new evidence; district court already balanced factors.	Objectors: English courts proceeded without the evidence, undermining usefulness and receptivity to U.S. assistance.	Majority: Developments bear on Intel discretionary factors; district court should reevaluate whether to grant discovery.
Magistrate authority under the Federal Magistrates Act (whether § 1782 quash motions are dispositive)	Khrapunov: magistrate’s handling as non-dispositive was acceptable and consistent with practice.	Objectors (and dissent): motions to quash under § 1782 are dispositive (they grant or deny the ultimate relief) and require de novo district judge review under Rule 72(b).	Dissent (Callahan J.): would hold § 1782 quash/enforce rulings are dispositive and remand for de novo district judge review; majority did not resolve this question on merits.

Key Cases Cited

Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004) (§ 1782 permits discovery for use in foreign proceedings that are "within reasonable contemplation" and sets discretionary Intel factors).
Euromepa, S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 154 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1998) (discovery under § 1782 cannot be used to justify reopening already completed foreign litigation).
Four Pillars Enters. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (district courts best positioned to review § 1782 requests; standard of review is abuse of discretion).
In re Premises Located at 840 140th Ave. NE, Bellevue, Wash., 634 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2011) (§ 1782 subpoena rulings are final and appealable; distinguishes § 1782 proceedings from ordinary domestic discovery).
Munsingwear, Inc. v. United States, 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (vacatur and remand when a case becomes moot while on appeal).