901 F. Supp. 2d 790
S.D. Miss.2012Background
- ICRR sued M. Daniel's estate and Cryogenic for negligent operation of a tractor-trailer at a Mississippi grade crossing; C. Daniel counter-claims for negligence against ICRR.
- FRSA pre-emption is central; the court must determine which state-law negligence claims survive federal regulation.
- The crossing at Andrew Jackson Circle near Airgas Carbonics involves spur and mainline tracks; accident occurred July 26, 2009, killing M. Daniel.
- Claims remaining after settlements: C. Daniel’s counter-claims against ICRR; numerous related parties dismissed or settled.
- The court considers four negligence theories: inadequate warning signals, excessive speed, inadequate sight distance, and failure of the ICRR engineer to avoid the collision.
- The court also addresses admissibility of evidence about federal funding and per se negligence theories, and notes trial will resolve certain factual issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| FRSA pre-emption of inadequate warning signals | Daniel argues signals may be insufficient and not pre-empted because funding evidence is privileged and not all signals were federally funded. | ICRR contends pre-emption applies to adequacy of signals funded by federal programs; post-issuance changes do not revive state law claims. | Pre-empted; signal adequacy claims barred by federal regulation. |
| FRSA pre-emption of excessive train speed | Daniel claims local-hazard exception allows state control over speed; pre-emption does not apply to this local hazard. | ICRR argues federal speed limits pre-empt state claims; local-hazard exception does not apply here. | Excessive-speed claims pre-empted; local-hazard exception not applicable. |
| FRSA pre-emption of sight-distance and vegetation-removal issues | Daniel asserts Mississippi statute and vegetation issues create state-law duty; pre-emption does not bar all sight-distance questions. | ICRR maintains sight-distance and vegetation are addressed via federal signal standards and pre-empted. | Sight-distance questions remain material facts; some aspects pre-empted, others for trial. |
| Negligence per se and proximate cause | Daniel contends M. Daniel violated a DOT regulation, potentially making ICRR's negligence the proximate cause. | ICRR asserts proximate cause is genuine fact for trial; per se liability requires proof of class membership and proximate cause, which is disputed. | Fact questions preclude summary judgment on negligence per se and proximate cause. |
Key Cases Cited
- Shanklin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 529 U.S. 344 (U.S. 2000) (FRSA pre-emption governs at-grade crossing signals funded by federal programs)
- Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 507 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1993) (federal standards and pre-emption of state law for crossing signaling)
- Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2005) (local-hazard concept and pre-emption of state signalization claims)
- Grade v. BNSF Ry. Co., 676 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2012) (amended FRSA pre-emption interpretation; narrow standard-of-care context)
- Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2008) (pre-emption where regulators require active signals; local hazard analysis)
- Baker v. CN/Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (sight-distance and visibility issues; summary judgment considerations)
- Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (U.S. 2003) (statutory privilege regarding data collected for federal funding)