Idaho Conservation League v. Atlanta Gold Corporation
1:11-cv-00161
D. IdahoSep 30, 2020Background
- Plaintiffs (Idaho Conservation League and Northwest Environmental Defense Center) sued Atlanta Gold under the Clean Water Act for arsenic and iron NPDES permit violations from a mine adit discharging to Montezuma Creek; prior proceedings and penalties dated back to 2005–2013.
- In 2012 the court entered an injunction and a $2,000,000 penalty (final judgment later entered and case closed in 2013); compliance efforts involved a zero-valent iron passive treatment system with intermittent exceedances.
- Plaintiffs moved to reopen the case in 2016 and sought civil contempt in 2017 after numerous documented arsenic and iron exceedances; the court held a two-day evidentiary hearing in April 2017.
- The court found Atlanta Gold in civil contempt, ordered additional penalties (with a contempt amount later reduced from $251,000 to $125,500 after partial remediation), and retained jurisdiction.
- Plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and litigation costs under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); Atlanta Gold did not oppose the fee motion, and Plaintiffs moved for default judgment on the fee request.
- The court denied default-judgment relief, independently reviewed reasonableness of the requested fees and costs, and awarded a total of $129,465.76 (breakdown: $8,527.26 expert; $47,810.00 Lucas; $64,407.50 Hurlbutt; $8,721.00 Hawley).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether default judgment should be entered on the fee motion | Atlanta Gold’s failure to respond = consent under local rule; entry of default judgment for full requested amount | No response / not presented | Denied — court must independently assess reasonableness of fees under §1365(d) before entering judgment |
| Whether Plaintiffs are prevailing or substantially prevailing parties for fee eligibility | Plaintiffs secured reopening, a Second Injunction, penalties and contempt relief | No opposition presented | Granted — Plaintiffs are prevailing/substantially prevailing parties under §1365(d) |
| Whether a fee award is appropriate under §1365(d) | Fee award appropriate absent special circumstances; fees should be awarded | No opposition presented | Granted — no special circumstances made award unjust; awards "should be the rule rather than the exception" |
| Reasonableness of specific requested fees (expert and attorneys) | Seek $130,883.26 itemized (expert Kuipers; attorneys Lucas, Hurlbutt, Hawley) | No opposition presented to specifics | Awarded in part: full award to Kuipers, Lucas, Hawley; Hurlbutt reduced (1.8 hrs disallowed; 9 hrs billed at 50%); total $129,465.76 awarded |
Key Cases Cited
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (lodestar method; degree of success controls fee reasonableness)
- Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2008) (lodestar and adjustments guidance)
- Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2001) (factors beyond lodestar may justify adjustment)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (degree of success is critical in fee awards)
- Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem Cnty. Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2009) (two-step test: prevailing party and appropriateness of fee under §1365(d))
- Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1956) (district court discretion on default judgment)
