Ibarra v. Holder, Jr.
736 F.3d 903
| 10th Cir. | 2013Background
- Ibarra Rivas, a Mexican-born immigrant, came to the U.S. in 1985 at age four and has seven U.S.-citizen children.
- In 2004, she pled guilty to Colorado “child abuse – negligence – no injury,” a class 3 misdemeanor under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(b)(II).
- The events allegedly involved negligently leaving children home alone while she worked; no child was injured.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings against her in 2008; she sought discretionary cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
- The immigration judge concluded she was ineligible for relief because her Colorado conviction allegedly fell within § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)’s “crime of child abuse” category, and the BIA affirmed that broad interpretation.
- The court reverses, holding her conviction is not a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under the INA and remands for reconsideration of discretionary relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Colorado conviction qualifies as a crime of child abuse under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). | Ibarra contends the BIA’s broad Velasquez-Soram definition is impermissible. | Holder argues the BIA’s unitary-definition approach is consistent with the statute. | No; conviction not a generic “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or abandonment.” Remand for discretionary relief. |
| What is the proper interpretation of the phrase ‘crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment’ in 1996 law? | Ibarra argues for a narrow, crime-based meaning aligned with criminal law in 1996. | BIA adopts a broad, civil-law-based definition of ‘child abuse.’ | The court rejects the broad BIA interpretation; applies a generic, crime-based meaning anchored in 1996 criminal norms. |
| Is the modified categorical approach necessary to resolve the predicate crime here? | If the state statute contains multiple crimes, a modified approach may be needed. | The state provision here comprises a single crime; no multiple offenses to parse. | Not necessary—the Colorado § 18-6-401(7)(b)(II) is not a generic match, so no modified approach applied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach to predicate offenses; avoid state-law gimmicks)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (limits on applying non-generic definitions to immigration crimes)
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (embedded clusters of ideas in borrowed terms; need for coherent meaning)
- Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (assessing generally accepted meanings of terms in federal statute)
- Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (statutory interpretation in immigration context; plain meaning governs)