Hymas v. United States
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 561
| Fed. Cir. | 2016Background
- The Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) has long used cooperative farming agreements (CFAs) permitting private farmers to cultivate refuge land in exchange for keeping ~75% of crops; remaining crops benefit wildlife. CFAs involve Service direction on crop choice, methods, chemicals, and harvest.
- In 2013–2014 the Service awarded several CFAs at Umatilla and McNary Refuges using a priority system favoring prior cooperators; Jay Hymas (Dosmen Farms), a nearby farmer, competed but was not selected.
- Hymas sued in the Court of Federal Claims alleging the Service violated federal procurement laws (CICA, FGCAA) and the APA by not conducting full-and-open competition for the CFAs.
- The Claims Court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss, treated the CFAs as procurements subject to Tucker Act bid-protest jurisdiction, found multiple statutory and regulatory violations, and enjoined further CFA awards pending compliance.
- The Federal Circuit majority vacated and remanded for dismissal, holding (1) the Service permissibly may enter cooperative agreements under statutes and regulations, (2) the CFAs are cooperative agreements (not procurement contracts) under the FGCAA, and (3) cooperative agreements are outside Tucker Act bid-protest jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hymas) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Service has statutory authority to enter CFAs with private farmers | 1958/1998 statutes do not authorize CFAs with private farmers; CFAs are procurements | Statutes and longstanding 50 C.F.R. rule permit cooperative agreements with any “person” including private farmers | Held: Service permissibly interpreted statutes and regs to authorize CFAs with private persons |
| Whether the CFAs are procurement contracts or cooperative agreements | CFAs function to obtain farming services for the Service (intermediary relationship) and thus are procurements | CFAs transfer a thing of value to farmers to carry out a public purpose and involve substantial agency involvement, fitting FGCAA cooperative-agreement criteria | Held: CFAs are cooperative agreements under the FGCAA (principal purpose is assistance, and Service retains substantial involvement) |
| Whether cooperative agreements like these fall within Tucker Act bid-protest jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §1491(b)) | Because CFAs are procurements, the Claims Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate statutory and APA challenges | Cooperative agreements are not procurements; Tucker Act bid-protest jurisdiction applies exclusively to procurements, so Claims Court lacks jurisdiction | Held: Cooperative agreements are not procurements for §1491(b) purposes; Claims Court lacked jurisdiction and case must be dismissed |
| Deference to agency interpretations (Chevron) on classification and scope of authority | Hymas: court should determine instrument type de novo and not defer to agency where jurisdiction is involved | United States: agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes/regulations about cooperative agreements deserve Chevron deference | Held: Court afforded deference to Service’s reasonable statutory/regulatory interpretations to authorize and characterize cooperative agreements; agency classification upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretation)
- Res. Conservation Grp., LLC v. United States, 597 F.3d 1238 (2010) (§1491(b) bid-protest jurisdiction pertains exclusively to procurements)
- CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 745 F.3d 1379 (2014) (distinguishing procurements from cooperative agreements under FGCAA; intermediary relationships can be procurements)
- Distributed Sols., Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1340 (2008) (use of 41 U.S.C. procurement definition in jurisdictional inquiries)
- United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) (presumption that Congress will explicitly amend existing statutory schemes if it intends to change them)
- Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (without jurisdiction a court must dismiss the cause)