Hutz v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 147 A.3d 35

Background

Earl Hutz, a Philadelphia firefighter with 33 years’ service, was diagnosed with prostate cancer in Feb/March 2006; he had surgery and radiation and missed ~3 months of work. He retired in January 2008.
Hutz filed a claim petition under Section 108(r) (firefighter cancer) in April 2012 seeking total disability benefits for March–June 2006; Employer denied the claim.
Claimant presented experts (Drs. Singer, Weaver, LeMasters) who opined firefighters are exposed to IARC Group 1 carcinogens and that such exposure materially contributed to prostate cancer risk; methodology relied on epidemiologic studies and differential diagnosis.
Employer presented Dr. Guidotti and Dr. Stanford who criticized the methodology and qualifications of Claimant’s primary expert, questioned study design, statistical significance, dose‑response, detection bias, and alternative non‑occupational risk factors.
The WCJ credited exposure to Group 1 carcinogens but rejected Claimant’s expert as not persuasive on causation (methodological and credential flaws) and found Employer’s expert persuasive; WCJ denied the claim and a penalty petition.
The Board affirmed on alternate grounds: Claimant filed within the 600‑week filing window but outside the 300‑week period in which Section 301(f)’s presumption applies; because Claimant failed to prove causation on the merits, the presumption did not apply and the denial was affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Section 301(f)’s 300‑week limit restricts availability of the statutory presumption unless the claim is filed within 300 weeks of last exposure	Hutz: presumption should apply if disease manifested within 300 weeks of last exposure; filing deadline is separate and discovery rule governs filing	Employer/Board: 301(f) limits the time period in which the presumption of compensability applies to claims filed within first 300 weeks after last exposure	Court: Section 301(f) limits the period the presumption applies; Claimant filed outside that 300‑week presumption window and also failed to prove causation, so presumption unavailable
Whether the discovery rule tolls or alters the 300‑week presumption period	Hutz: discovery rule delays accrual until diagnosis or knowledge that disease is work‑related	Employer: 301(f) shows legislative intent to treat the 300‑week presumption period as fixed; discovery rule irrelevant to presumption window	Court: Moot—because Claimant failed to prove causation, presumption never arose; no need to resolve discovery‑rule application here
Whether Claimant proved general/specific causation linking exposure to Hutz’s prostate cancer	Hutz: experts and studies show elevated prostate cancer risk in firefighters; exposures (arsenic, PAHs, diesel, etc.) were substantial contributing factors	Employer: Claimant’s expert lacked epidemiologic/statistical credentials, misapplied studies, and failed to rule out other common risk factors; Employer’s expert undermined claimant evidence	Court: WCJ’s credibility findings accepting Employer’s critique were supported by record; Claimant failed to meet burden to establish causation
Whether Employer’s expert evidence was competent to rebut presumption absent an individual‑specific causation opinion	Hutz: Guidotti didn’t give a specific cause for Hutz’s cancer, so cannot rebut statutory presumption	Employer: Expert’s methodological critique of claimant evidence is relevant and can rebut prima facie case	Court: Consistent with Sladek, employer evidence need not give a definitive individual cause when claimant fails to establish causation; Employer’s expert was competent and persuasive

Key Cases Cited

Inglis House v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1993) (burden rules for occupational disease claims)
Fotta v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (U.S. Steel), 626 A.2d 1144 (Pa. 1993) (unequivocal medical testimony required when causal connection is not obvious)
Pawlosky v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Latrobe Brewing Co.), 525 A.2d 1204 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (work‑related cause must be a substantial contributing factor when both work and non‑work factors implicated)
City of McKeesport v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Miletti), 746 A.2d 87 (Pa. 2000) (occupational disease "occurrence" focus under Section 301(c)(2))
Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2013) (Section 301(c)(2) time limitation barring very late‑manifesting occupational disease claims)
Jeannette Dist. Mem. Hosp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mesich), 668 A.2d 249 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (rebuttal of statutory presumption requires substantial competent evidence)
Amandeo v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Conagra Foods), 37 A.3d 72 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (review of medical testimony as a whole; competency assessed in context)
Phoenixville Hosp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Shoap), 81 A.3d 830 (Pa. 2013) (scope of appellate review of WCJ findings)
Grady v. Frito‑Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 2003) (Frye/Pa. R.E. 702 issues on general acceptance of scientific methodology)