Humphries v. DETCH
227 W. Va. 627
| W. Va. | 2011Background
- Humphries was convicted in 1999 of being an accessory before the fact to first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder for a 1976 killing, receiving prison terms of 1–5 years and life with parole possible after 10 years, respectively.
- On remand for a new trial due to ineffective assistance, Humphries pled nolo contendere in 2007 to being an accessory before the fact to murder in the second degree and was sentenced to 5–18 years, with credit for time served.
- Humphries served additional time after remand, was released in February 2008, and then filed a legal malpractice action against his former criminal defense attorney Detch in July 2007.
- Detch moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing Humphries could not prove actual innocence due to the nolo plea, and the circuit court granted the motion in December 2009.
- The WV Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding actual innocence is an essential element in a legal malpractice claim against a criminal defense attorney, and the nolo plea did not bar admissibility of the resulting conviction for purposes of causation.
- The dissent argued that a nolo contendere plea should be treated as non-admission and not admissible under Rule 410, and that the majority’s ruling undermines historical procedural rules.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is actual innocence required in criminal malpractice suits? | Humphries argues innocence should not be required as an extra element. | Detch argues most jurisdictions require actual innocence to recover. | Actual innocence required; no recovery without innocence proof. |
| Does the plaintiff’s own criminal conduct causally preclude damages? | No, defense attorney negligence should be proximate cause. | Plaintiff's own conduct is the proximate cause due to underlying conviction. | Causation barred where innocence is not proven and plea consequences reflect plaintiff's conduct. |
| Does a nolo contendere plea bar recovery in a legal malpractice action? | Plea is not an admission of guilt and Rule 410 should limit use of the plea. | Plea has effective consequences akin to conviction; admissible and controls causation. | Nolo plea can lead to admission of conviction for purposes of evidence; cannot recover incarceration damages from attorney. |
| May a nolo contendere plea be used under Rule 410 to affect civil action? | 410 prohibits use of the plea itself, but may permit conviction evidence. | Conviction arising from the plea is admissible and supports proof of guilt. | Conviction derived from a nolo plea is admissible to prove conviction; 410 does not bar it in this context. |
| Does collateral estoppel apply to defeat innocence proof based on a prior plea? | Collateral estoppel should not bar innocence proof in a legal malpractice action. | Collateral estoppel could preclude innocence proof if the plea resolved guilt. | Collateral estoppel not decisive; analysis rests on actual innocence and causation under the ruling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Calvert v. Scharf, 217 W.Va. 684 (2005) (defines general elements of Civil malpractice claim against attorney)
- Correia v. Fagan, 452 Mass. 120 (2008) (requires proof of actual innocence in criminal malpractice claims)
- Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 (1991) (innocence must be proven by preponderance of the evidence)
- Evans v. State, 203 W.Va. 446 (1998) (discusses admissibility of conviction from nolo plea; Rule 410 context)
- Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52 (1999) (Rule 410 does not bar conviction evidence arising from a nolo plea)
- Brown v. Theos, 550 S.E.2d 304 (2001) (no-contest plea as bar to criminal malpractice recovery)
- Leach v. Schlaegel, 191 W.Va. 538 (1994) (supports evidentiary treatment of pleas and finality considerations)