Humphrey v. Morrow, 289 Ga. 864

Morrow was convicted of the December 29, 1994 murders of Barbara Young and Tonya Woods, the aggravated battery of LaToya Horne, and related crimes, and was sentenced to death; conviction and sentence were affirmed in 2000.
A capital-sentencing habeas petition was filed in 2001 and amended in 2005; an evidentiary hearing occurred in 2005, and the habeas court vacated the death sentence for ineffective assistance of trial counsel in sentencing but did not disturb convictions.
The Warden appealed the vacating of the death sentence and Morrow cross-appealed; the Supreme Court of Georgia ultimately reversed the habeas court, reinstating the death sentence, while affirming the convictions.
The trial evidence showed Morrow shot Woods and Young inside Young’s home, severely injured Horne, and fled after severing telephone lines; the killings occurred amid a volatile relationship with Young, including an incident of domestic violence and alleged rapes.
The court applied Strickland's standard for ineffective assistance, reviewing under de novo appellate review the adequacy of trial counsel’s performance and prejudice, including cumulative effects of alleged deficiencies.
The Court held that trial counsel generally performed adequately and that, even assuming some deficiencies, there was no reasonable probability that the outcomes would have differed in either guilt/innocence or sentencing phases; the death sentence was reinstated on appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Effectiveness of counsel in sentencing phase	Morrow argues counsel failed to uncover mitigating evidence	State contends counsel's performance was adequate and any deficiencies were not prejudicial	No reasonable probability of different outcome; no reversible error
Failure to discover Northeast life evidence	Counsel should have unearthed childhood/ Northeast records harming Morrow	Evidence would not meaningfully affect jury’s assessment; not prejudicial	No prejudice; evidence would not have significantly altered verdict
Failure to use independent forensic expert	Independent forensic testimony could have changed sentencing/ guilt	Testimony would be unlikely to produce a different result	Not prejudicial; expert testimony would be cumulative or non-mitigation
Form of sentencing verdict	Verdict form obscured whether death was individually warranted for each murder	No prejudice; two death sentences would remain	No reversible error; form not shown to alter outcome
Jury composition/proportionality claims on habeas	New facts justify revisiting jury composition and proportionality on habeas	Claims barred by res judicata/ procedural default	Jury composition barred; proportionality not reconsidered; default survives

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1984) (establishes standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2003) (abhorrent to withhold mitigating information; prejudice analysis in Strickland)
Rompilla v. Beardon, 545 U.S. 374 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2005) (applies Strickland to sentencing mitigation evidence)
Hall v. Lance, 286 Ga. 365 (Ga. 2010) (re-examining direct-appeal issues on habeas corpus when appropriate)
Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691 (Ga. 2000) (direct-appeal affirmance of convictions and death sentence)