Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc. (Slip Opinion)
142 Ohio St. 3d 236
| Ohio | 2014Background
- Patricia Hulsmeyer, a Hospice of Southwest Ohio nurse/team manager, reported suspected bruising/abuse of a Brookdale residential-care resident to Brookdale staff and the resident’s family after being told she had an obligation to notify them.
- Hospice’s policy required reporting suspected abuse to the CEO/designee; Hospice terminated Hulsmeyer for allegedly failing to notify Hospice first and for photos being taken/shared.
- Hulsmeyer sued for retaliatory discharge under R.C. 3721.24 and for common-law wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; defendants moved to dismiss the statutory claim as insufficient because Hulsmeyer did not report to the Ohio Director of Health.
- The trial court dismissed the statutory claim; the First District reversed, holding R.C. 3721.24 does not require reporting to the Director of Health.
- The Ohio Supreme Court accepted discretionary review and certified the issue: whether protection under R.C. 3721.24 requires reporting (or intent to report) suspected abuse to the Director of Health.
- The Court held R.C. 3721.24 does not require that the report (or intent to report) be made to the Director of Health to state a retaliatory-discharge claim and remanded to reinstate Hulsmeyer’s statutory claim; it declined to decide her cross-appeal for a wrongful-discharge remedy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 3721.24 requires reporting (or intent to report) suspected abuse to the Ohio Director of Health to state a retaliatory-discharge claim | Hulsmeyer: statute’s plain language has no recipient limitation; protection applies regardless of whom the report was made to | Defendants: read R.C. 3721.24 in pari materia with R.C. 3721.22 (which requires reports to Director of Health) so statutory protection requires a report to the Director | Court: No. R.C. 3721.24’s plain language protects employees who report or intend to report suspected abuse without requiring the report be made to the Director of Health |
| Whether the court should recognize a common-law wrongful-discharge claim if statutory protection were limited to reports to the Director of Health | Hulsmeyer (cross-appeal): if statutory remedy is narrow, wrongful-discharge claim should be available when reporting to others | Defendants: statutory remedy (R.C. 3721.24) suffices; other statutes (e.g., whistleblower law) may apply | Court: Declined to decide because it found statutory claim cognizable; Justice Pfeifer concurred that a common-law claim should be allowed; Justice French would have recognized such a claim when report is not to the Director |
| Whether R.C. 3721.24 is ambiguous and should be construed with R.C. 3721.22 | Hulsmeyer: statute is unambiguous; no need to read in R.C. 3721.22 requirements | Defendants: silence in 3721.24 leaves ambiguity; must construe statutes in pari materia to require reporting to Director | Court: R.C. 3721.24 is not ambiguous; differing wording between 3721.22 and 3721.24 is intentional and should not be judicially altered |
| Remedy and remand instructions | Hulsmeyer seeks reinstatement of statutory claim and further proceedings | Defendants sought dismissal of statutory claim | Court: Affirmed court of appeals, reinstated Hulsmeyer’s R.C. 3721.24 claim and remanded for further proceedings; made no merits determination |
Key Cases Cited
- Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190 (1988) (standard for accepting allegations on motion to dismiss)
- Sheet Metal Workers’ Internatl. Assn. v. Gene’s Refrig., Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 248 (2009) (statutory ambiguity merits in pari materia construction)
- State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308 (2004) (statutory-construction goal is to ascertain legislative intent)
- Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 153 (2011) (interpretive approach: examine statutory language and purpose)
- Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122 (2008) (court must give effect to the words used; do not add or delete statutory language)
