Huisha-Huisha v. Gaynor, 560 F.Supp.3d 146

Background

Plaintiffs are asylum‑seeking family units detained by DHS after crossing the U.S. land border and subject to the CDC’s Title 42 expulsions (orders issued under 42 U.S.C. § 265 beginning March 2020).
The CDC issued an Interim Final Rule and a series of orders (March–October 2020; superseded by an August 2, 2021 order) authorizing suspension of the “introduction” of persons to prevent COVID‑19 transmission; DHS/CBP implemented expulsions of covered noncitizens, including family units.
Plaintiffs allege the Title 42 Process summarily expels families without access to asylum, withholding, or CAT protections required by the INA and FARRA, and that expulsions expose them to persecution and violence if returned.
Plaintiffs moved for class certification (seeking a (b)(2) class of family units subject to Title 42) and for a classwide preliminary injunction enjoining application of the Title 42 Process to the class.
The government defended Title 42 as a public‑health measure within CDC authority under § 265 and argued an injunction would harm public health and CBP operations.
The court granted class certification and a classwide preliminary injunction (stayed 14 days), concluding § 265 does not authorize expulsions and the other injunction factors favor relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Class certification under Rule 23(a)/(b)(2)	The Title 42 Process is a uniform policy depriving family units of statutory asylum procedures; class is numerous, common, typical, adequate, and seeks indivisible injunctive relief.	The class definition is vague because “Title 42 Process” is not precisely defined, so Rule 23 requirements (esp. commonality/typicality) are unmet.	Granted: class of family units subject to Title 42 certified under Rule 23(b)(2); definition was sufficiently definite for injunctive relief.
Whether 42 U.S.C. § 265 authorizes expulsions/removals	§ 265 does not mention expulsion or removal; it authorizes suspension of “introduction” (quarantine/prevention), not deportation that would displace statutory immigration protections.	“Prohibit the introduction” is broad and includes intercepting/halting a continuing process of introduction, which can encompass expelling persons who are “in the process” of being introduced.	Held for Plaintiffs: § 265 does not authorize expulsions from the United States; statutory text and context show no congressional delegation to expel people that bypasses immigration statutes.
Agency deference (Chevron / Kisor) to CDC’s interpretation of “introduction”	No Chevron deference because § 265 unambiguously does not permit expulsions; even if ambiguous, CDC’s technical expertise does not justify deference on this statutory question reconciling public‑health and immigration regimes.	CDC/agency interpretation merits deference under Chevron given delegated rulemaking authority and public‑health expertise.	Court declined to defer: found statute unambiguous and in any event agency expertise did not resolve the legal question; Chevron deference not applied to sustain expulsions.
Irreparable harm from expulsions absent injunction	Expulsions deny access to asylum/withholding/CAT protections and may send families to persecution, harms that cannot be remedied later—therefore irreparable.	Harms are individualized and speculative; CDC process provides some opportunity to seek CAT relief; injunction risks public‑health harms.	Held for Plaintiffs: credible evidence of likely irreparable harm (risk of persecution and loss of judicial remedy if expelled) supported injunction.
Balance of equities / public interest re: injunction	Public interest favors preventing unlawful agency action and avoiding wrongful removals to persecutory conditions; mitigation (testing, detention, release to sponsors) can address COVID risks.	Injunction would increase COVID‑19 transmission risk, strain CBP capacity, and incentivize border migration (pull factor).	Held for Plaintiffs: equities and public interest favor injunction—no public interest in perpetuating unlawful action; health risks could be mitigated and do not outweigh irreparable harm to class.

Key Cases Cited

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (framework for reviewing agency statutory interpretation)
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (agencies may not expand statutory terms beyond clear congressional intent)
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (statutory text should be read in context and given its plain meaning)
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (standard for preliminary injunctions requires likelihood of irreparable harm and consideration of equities)
Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (Rule 23 commonality and (b)(2) principles)
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (when government is opposing party, balance of equities and public interest factors merge)
P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp. 3d 492 (D.D.C. 2020) (related D.D.C. decision assessing Title 42 authority)
Kiakombua v. Wolf, 498 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020) (context on asylum policy and statutory protections)
INS v. Cardoza‑Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (definitional standard for refugee/asylum eligibility)
INS v. Aguirre‑Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (withholding of removal as mandatory if statutory criteria met)
League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (no public interest in perpetuation of unlawful agency action)