Hughes v. United States, 770 F.3d 814

Hughes seeks authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence for a § 924(c)(1) offense.
At sentencing (2004), the district court found Hughes used a semi-automatic weapon, increasing the mandatory minimum to ten years, based on a preponderance of the evidence.
Hughes appealed; the Ninth Circuit affirmed reliance on the preponderance-based finding under Ham v. United States.
In 2013, Alleyne overruled Harris and held any fact increasing penalty, including the minimum, is an element to be proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt.
Hughes later filed pro se and then with counsel a supplemental application arguing Alleyne violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by a non-jury, preponderance-based finding.
The district court could not have imposed additional imprisonment based on Alleyne unless the rule is retroactive, prompting Teague-based retroactivity analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Alleyne is retroactive on collateral review	Hughes argues Alleyne is retroactive via multiple holdings (Ivan V./Hankerson) applying Apprendi retroactivity.	United States contends Alleyne did not retroactively apply to collateral review.	Alleyne is not retroactive; no single or multiple holdings establish retroactivity.
Whether Hughes may file a second or successive § 2255 motion based on Alleyne	Hughes contends Alleyne creates a retroactive, new rule that qualifies for authorization.	Since Alleyne is not retroactive, no new rule warrants authorization for successive § 2255 relief.	Application for authorization denied.
Whether Alleyne falls within Teague watershed or substantive exceptions	Hughes frames Alleyne as a watershed-type procedural rule retroactive under Teague’s exceptions.	Alleyne does not satisfy the narrow watershed exception; it is not a substantive rule.	Alleyne does not meet the watershed or other retroactivity exceptions; no retroactive application.

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (held that any fact increasing the penalty must be submitted to a jury)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing the penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (new rules of criminal procedure generally do not apply on collateral review)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (watershed exception for retroactivity is extremely narrow)
Sanchez-Cervantes v. United States, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002) (Apprendi retroactivity not established; circuit position on retroactivity)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (prior conviction exception and standard for proof in criminal trials)
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (standard for proving factual elements affecting penalty)
Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (retroactivity reasoning linked to Winship/Mullaney line)
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977) (retroactivity reasoning linked to Winship/Mullaney line)
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (referenced as Harris; pre-Alleyne standard on trial findings)