Hughes v. Kisela
862 F.3d 775
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Officers responded to a “check welfare” report of a person allegedly hacking at a tree with a large knife; no crime was reported.
- Amy Hughes emerged from her house holding a large kitchen knife at her side and walked toward housemate Sharon Chadwick.
- Officers (including Corporal Kisela) ordered Hughes to drop the knife at least twice; Hughes did not drop it and did not acknowledge officers, according to some witnesses.
- A chain-link fence prevented officers from closing distance; Kisela fired four shots through the fence, wounding but not killing Hughes.
- Material facts are disputed: witnesses differ on whether Hughes raised or threatened with the knife, whether she appeared threatening or composed, whether she understood commands, and whether less-lethal options (e.g., Taser) were feasible.
- District court granted summary judgment for Kisela (qualified immunity); Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kisela’s use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment (excessive force) | Shooting was unreasonable because Hughes committed no serious crime, was composed, did not threaten or raise the knife, and officers had indications of mental illness and could have used less-lethal means | Shooting was reasonable because Hughes was armed, approached another person, ignored commands, and officers reasonably perceived an immediate threat given split-second decision-making and physical barrier | Reversed: viewing disputed facts in plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could find the force unreasonable; summary judgment on excessive force improper |
| Whether Kisela is entitled to qualified immunity | Precedent (e.g., Deorle) and the circumstances placed the unlawfulness of shooting beyond debate; reasonable officer should have known deadly force was not permitted | Qualified immunity applies because clearly analogous precedent permitting force exists (e.g., Blanford) and officers must make split-second judgments | Reversed: because factual disputes could establish a constitutional violation, and existing precedent (not identical but including Deorle/Harris) put the unlawfulness beyond debate in these viewed facts, Kisela is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment |
| Role of mental illness in reasonableness analysis | Mental disturbance was known and diminishes governmental interest in using deadly force; officers should have considered it | Mental illness does not automatically preclude using force when officer reasonably perceives danger | Court: evidence of mental illness is a relevant factor that can diminish governmental interest; jury must weigh it |
| Availability/necessity of less-lethal alternatives and warnings | Officers failed to give adequate warning and could have used less-lethal means (Taser); absence of warning and alternatives makes shooting unreasonable | Officers need not use the least intrusive means and warnings/taser may have been impracticable given fence and time constraints | Court: existence of disputed expert testimony and factual disputes about warnings/alternatives precludes summary judgment; jury to decide |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness standard for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force permitted only when officer has probable cause to believe suspect poses serious threat)
- Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (use of deadly force unreasonable against certain mentally disturbed persons; factors to weigh)
- Glenn v. Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2011) (similar facts remanded where factual disputes precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity)
- Blanford v. Sacramento Cty., 406 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (officers entitled to immunity where suspect carried a large sword and ignored warnings)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two-step: constitutional violation and clearly established law)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity protects reasonable mistaken judgments; precedent must place question beyond debate)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (in obvious cases general Fourth Amendment standards can clearly establish the answer)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (courts must define clearly established law with attention to the officer’s specific conduct and context)