Hubert Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc.
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17810
| 7th Cir. | 2013Background
- Walker sues Trailer Transit in Indiana state court on a class-wide breach-of-lease claim concerning add-on fees and profit-sharing; CAFA removal to federal court alleged; removal disputed on timeliness; district court denied remand; Walker seeks appellate review under 28 U.S.C. §1453(c)(1); the court adopts a bright-line standard for the 30-day removal clock; the key question is when the clock starts under §1446(b)(3);Removal relied on later-clarified damages theory introduced via requests for admission and subsequent communications; earliest trigger was Walker’s admission confirming the class sought 71% of total fees, but that did not specify a damages amount; the court holds the removal was not untimely and affirms district court’s denial of remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the 30-day removal clock begin under §1446(b)(3)? | Walker argues the clock starts when a pleading or paper reveals removability. | Trailer Transit argues timing should be tied to when the defendant first receives a notice that removal is possible. | The clock starts when a pleading/paper affirmatively and unambiguously reveals removability. |
| Must the amount-in-controversy be expressly stated to start the clock? | Walker contends any clear indication of greater damages could trigger removal earlier. | Trailer Transit contends explicit damages figures are required to trigger removal. | Explicit, unambiguous damages figures are required to start the clock. |
| Did Walker's summary-judgment response or attorney email suffice to start the clock? | Walker argues these communications signaled a new damages theory. | Trailer Transit maintains these were ambiguous and did not reveal a $5+ million threshold. | Neither sufficed to start the clock. |
| Did Walker's responses to requests for admission trigger the clock? | Walker says admission clarified the damages theory. | The admission did not alone specify a monetary amount. | Removal clock did not start from the admission; the clock never actually started until an explicit amount was identified. |
| Is removal timely where the evidence of damages met CAFA thresholds only after later communications and estimate? | Walker argues timing should be measured from when damages could exceed $5 million. | Removal is timely if later communications provide the unambiguous basis. | Removal was not untimely; the district court properly denied remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2013) (clock begins when initial pleading explicitly reveals jurisdictional amount)
- Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs., 707 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) (clock begins when the basis for removal is affirmatively disclosed)
- Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 624 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2010) (damages basis must be explicit in the paper enabling removal)
- Willis v. Interstate Com. Athletic Ass’n, 228 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2000) (clock starts on explicit notice of jurisdictional amount)
- Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 1998) (clear and unequivocal notice required for removal trigger)
- Lovern v. Gen. Motors Corp., 121 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 1997) (grounds for removal must be apparent within the initial pleading or subsequent paper)
- Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005) (statute authorizes review of district court decision beyond CAFA issues)
- Price v. Wyeth Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2007) (purpose of 30-day limit includes preventing tactical delay)
- Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2006) (burden on removing defendant to show jurisdictional facts)
- Koral v. Boeing Co., 628 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2011) (CAFA appeal considerations where novel issues arise)