Hubbard v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co.
2011 OK 50
| Okla. | 2011Background
- Hubbard sued Defendants for breach of oil and gas lease and gas purchase contract on May 5, 2004.
- Defendants filed § 1101.1(B) offers of judgment on May 25 and June 4, 2004; Hubbard rejected them.
- Court granted summary judgment favoring Defendants on March 28, 2005; Hubbard appealed.
- Case later remanded with a requirement to include a judgment roll from a related case; Defendants sought costs/fees incurred since July 7, 2005.
- November 8, 2007, district court again granted summary judgment in Defendants' favor; Hubbard appealed December 7, 2007.
- On October 16, 2008, mandate issued after appellate proceedings; Defendants sought remaining fees and costs incurred up to mandate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a prevailing defendant recover under § 1101.1(B)? | Hubbard argues no judgment was awarded to him, so § 1101.1(B) does not apply to a defendant. | Defendants contend a defendant can recover costs/fees under § 1101.1(B) when it prevails. | Yes; a defendant's judgment can trigger § 1101.1(B) recovery. |
| Do offers survive remand without renewal after appeal? | Hubbard argues offers must be renewed post-remand to recover costs. | Defendants argue no renewal is required; offers remain available unless final adjudication occurs. | Offers survive remand without renewal; no renewed offer required. |
| When is the judgment final for § 1101.1(B)(3) purposes? | Final adjudication occurs only when a plaintiff is awarded judgment; otherwise no trigger. | Final adjudication occurs when the claims in the offer become res judicata, i.e., final judgment on those claims. | Final adjudication occurs when the relevant claims become res judicata; mandate date can mark finality. |
| Must an offer of judgment be reasonable to invoke § 1101.1(B)? | Hubbard contends offers may be nominal; reasonableness not required by statute. | Defendants argue reasonableness is implied by the statute's costs/fees framework. | Yes; offers must be reasonable to trigger fee-shifting. |
Key Cases Cited
- Boston Ave. Mgmt., Inc. v. Associated Res., Inc., 152 P.3d 880 (OK 2007) (establishes interpretation of final adjudication and § 1101.1(B) timing)
- Fuller v. Pacheco, 21 P.3d 74 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) (reasonableness standard in fee awards under § 1101.1)
- Commercial Financial Services, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc., 152 P.3d 897 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) (recognizes application of § 1101.1(B) in certain contexts)
- Hopkins v. Byrd, 146 P.3d 864 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) (illustrates related fee/expense considerations under Oklahoma practice)
- Depuy v. Hoeme, 775 P.2d 1339 (Okla. 1989) (final adjudication concept and res judicata interplay)
