Opinion by
{1 Dеfendant, Amanda Byrd, appeals an order of the trial court denying her request for an award of attorney fees against Plaintiff, Leann Hopkins, pursuant to 12 0.8. Rev. Supp.2005 § 1101.1. Plaintiff counter-appeals the award of costs to Defendant pursuant to § 1101.1 and 12 0.8.2001 § 942. The issue on appeal is whether Defendant is entitled to costs and attorney fees even though her costs and attorney fees were paid by her liability insurer. We find that Defendant is entitled to an award of costs and аttorney fees pursuant to § 1101.1, and affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
1 2 Plaintiff filed her action against Defendant seeking damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile collision. Defendant offered to confess judgment, pursuant to § 1101.1, in the amount of $5,000; the offer was deemed rejected for lack of response from Plaintiff. The case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict for Defendant; a judgment was entеred consistent with the jury's verdict.
T 3 Defendant filed an application for costs pursuant to 12 00.98.2001 §§ 929, 942, and 12 0.8. Rev. Supp.2005 § 1101.1, and for attorney fees pursuant to § 1101.1. Plaintiff responded to Defendant's request by challenging the reasonableness of the attorney fees and the recoverability of some of the costs. The trial court ruled as follows:
The Court ... finds that costs in the amount of two thousand, three hundred fifteen dollars ($2,315.00) should be awarded pursuant to 12 O.S. § 942 and costs in the amount of five hundred eight dollars and thirty eight cents ($508.88) should be awarded pursuant to 12 0.8. § 1101.1. As to the issue of attorney fees, the Court finds that the Defendant had in place a policy of liability insurance which by its terms provided Defendant with legal representation, either by an outside defense attorney or by an in-house attorney-employee of the insurance company. As a result, the Defendant did not ineur attorney fees. Consequently, Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees is denied in full.
Defendant appeals the denial of her request for attorney fees, and Plaintiff appeals the award of costs.
1 4 The issue of whether Defendant is entitled to costs and attorney fees pursuant to § 1101.1 presents a question of statutory construction аnd is "subject to an appellate court's plenary, independent and nondeferen-tial reexamination" Twin Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Forest Park,
¶5 It is undisputed that Plaintiff demanded more than $100,000 in damages from Defendant; Defendant offered to confess judgment for $5,000 pursuant to § 1101.1(A); the offer was deemed rejected because Plaintiff did not file a response to it; and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant. Pursuant to § 1101.1(A)(8), Defendant is "entitled to recover reasonable litigation costs and reasonаble attorney fees incurred by [Defendant] from the date of filing of the final offer of judgment until the date of the verdict." In denying the request for attorney fees, the trial court focused on the word *866 "incurred" and determined that, because Defеndant's insurer, not Defendant, incurred attorney fees on behalf of Defendant, Defendant cannot recover fees. We disagree with the trial court's conclusion.
16 "The goal of any inquiry into the meaning of a legislative enactment is to ascertain and follow its legislative intent." Bronson Trailers & Trucks v. Newman,
T7 Section 1101.1 was enacted in 1995 as part of the Tort Reform Law. Charles W. Adams, Recent Developments in Oklahoma Laow-Civil Procedure, 31 Tulsa L.J. 758, 754 (1996) (citing 1995 Okla. Sеss. Laws 287). It is similar to 12 0.8.2001 § 1101, which governs offers of judgment in actions for the recovery of money and allows a recovery of costs, but not attorney fees, if a plaintiff fails to obtain a judgment for more than the defendant offered. The purpоse of § 1101 is to promote "judgments without protracted litigation" by furnishing "additional incentives to encourage a plaintiff to accept a defendant's offer to confess judgment" and to encourage a defendant to offer to confess early so as to "avoid further increases in costs which may be incurred [for] trial preparation." Dulan v. Johnston,
T8 For varying reasons, courts in other jurisdictions have rejected the idea that a party that is provided a defense through an insurance policy or other indemnification agreement may not recover costs or attorney fees pursuant to a statute that would аllow such recovery. Most directly on point is Aspen v. Bayless,
Id. at 1082-83.
1 9 In Hаle v. Erickson, 23 P.8d 1255, 1257 (Colo.Ct.App.2001), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that to prohibit a defendant from recovering costs under a similar statute would severely thwart the purposes of the statute, which are to penalize a nоnsettling plaintiff, encourage settlement, curb protracted and fruitless litigation, and discourage the filing of unnecessary litigation. "Insurance defense is common, and plaintiffs in such situations necessarily would have less incentive to settle." Id. In Ferrer v. Ngo,
A plaintiff retains the right to sue for damages notwithstanding the fact that *867 those damages have been or will be paid by the plaintiff's insurer. When a party's insurer is providing defense and coverage, the party and the insurer are, to the limits of the coverage, one party defending under the name of the insured. The benefits flowing from a party's insurance coverage flow in favor of the insured party, not the adverse party.
See also Mullins v. Kessler,
¶10 It is clear from the language of § 1101.1, its history, and the interpretаtion placed on § 1101 that the intent of § 1101.1 is to encourage settlements prior to trial, lessen litigation costs, and decrease the number of baseless lawsuits. A plaintiff must seriously consider a defendant's settlement offer or face the possibility of being made to pay the defendant's costs and attorney fees. The trial court's interpretation of § 1101.1 would thwart these purposes, because it would limit the application of § 1101.1 to cases where the defendant is not insured. This would remove thousands of cases from the umbrella of § 1101.1 and would do little to encourage early settlement of cases. Moreover, a plaintiff would benefit from a defendant's fortuitous procurement of insurance. The triаl court's interpretation of the language of § 1101.1 cannot be what the legislature meant.
¶11 We also note, as pointed out in the amicus brief of the Oklahoma Association of Defense Counsel, that the trial court's interpretatiоn could possibly affect other statutes that allow the recovery of attorney fees and costs imeurred by a party. For instance, 12 0.8. Rev. Supp.2005 § 2011 allows sanctions to be imposed against an attorney for filing frivolous pleadings, mоtions, and other papers. The sanction may include payment "of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred [by the moving party] as a direct result of the violation." (Emphasis added.) See also 12 0.8. Rev. Supp.2005 § 2011.1 (sanctions for frivolous actions not arising out of contract). "[The purpose of the sanction provision in § 2011 is to discourage pleadings, motions or other papers that are frivolous or are filed for an improper purpose such as delay." Cooper v. Booher,
§12 Similar to § 2011, 12 0.8. Rev. Supp.2005 §§ 3226.1, 3230, and 3237 allow as a sanction for discovery abuses the recovery of costs and attorney fees incurred. These sanctions are "dеsigned as a tool to compel production of evidence, compensate adversaries for unnecessary expense and deter misconduct." Cf. Payne v. Dewitt,
{13 We must conclude that Defendant is entitled to recover both her attorney fees and costs under § 929 and § 1101.1. On remand, the trial court shall hold a hearing to determine the reasonable attorney fees that accrued after Defendant offered to confess *868 judgment. Beсause Plaintiff only challenges Defendant's entitlement to costs and not the reasonableness of the costs awarded by the trial court, the award of costs is affirmed. 3
T14 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Notes
. With regard to the last reason, the Florida Supreme Court said, "Most tоrt claims involve liability insurance companies which are contractually obligated to pay litigation costs on behalf of, and to indemnify and pay costs assessed against, their insureds. If a named insured is unable to obtain costs under [the offer to confess judgment statute], there would be less incentive to accept an offer to settle and no penalty for failing to do so." Aspen,
. Other examples of statutes that use the word "incurred" in relation to recovеry of costs or attorney fees are 12 0.8. Rev. Supp.2005 § 832.1 (duty of manufacturer to indemnify seller in products liability action); 12 0.$.2001 § 995 (dismissal of frivolous appeals) 12 0.S.2001 § 1106 (offer to "confess judgment for part of the amount claimed, or part of the cаuses involved in the action"); 12 O.S. Rev. Supp.2005 § 1876 (judgments entered in conformity with orders "confirming, vacating without directing a rehearing, modifying, or correcting an award"); 15 0.8.2001 § 761.1 (frivolous actions or defenses under the Consumer Protection Act);
. In addition to challenging an award of costs incurred after the offer to confess judgment made pursuant to § 1101.1, Plaintiff challenges the award of costs under 12 0.$.2001 §§ 929 and 942. For the same reasons discussed above, we conclude that Defendant is entitled to costs as prevailing party under § 929, as well as pursuant to § 1101.1.