Howick v. Salt Lake City Corp.
424 P.3d 841
Utah2018Background
- Jodi Howick worked as an attorney for Salt Lake City and initially held merit protection status; in July 1998 she accepted a promoted position and signed a disclaimer stating the appointment would be at-will.
- In 2007 the City terminated Howick; she sought review asserting she remained a merit employee entitled to statutory protections.
- The district court initially ruled she was a merit employee; the Utah Court of Appeals agreed she was merit-status but held merit protections could be forfeited by contract, waiver, or estoppel and remanded to decide if forfeiture occurred.
- On remand the district court granted summary judgment for the City, finding Howick had forfeited merit status by contract, was equitably estopped from asserting merit status, and had waived her rights; it concluded she was an at-will employee when terminated.
- On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, Howick challenged only the contract-based ruling (arguing the disclaimer was unenforceable and in conflict with the Merit Protection Statute) but did not meaningfully challenge the district court’s independent estoppel finding in her opening brief.
- The Supreme Court affirmed because Howick failed to challenge all independent grounds (estoppel) supporting the district court’s judgment, so the Court did not reach the broader statutory/ public-policy questions about contracts waiving government-employee statutory protections.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the disclaimer/contract converted Howick to at-will and thus allowed forfeiture of merit status | Howick: the disclaimer is not a valid contract (no consideration, conflicts with statute) and cannot extinguish statutory merit protections | City: the disclaimer/contract (and attendant waiver/estoppel) validly removed merit protections, making Howick at-will | Court did not decide the contract validity issue on the merits because Howick failed to challenge the district court’s independent estoppel ruling; judgment affirmed on that ground |
| Whether an employee can be estopped from asserting merit status | Howick: did not meaningfully dispute estoppel in opening brief | City: relied on estoppel as independent defense based on parties’ conduct and reliance | Court upheld district court’s estoppel finding (appellant’s failure to challenge it is dispositive) |
| Whether statutory public-policy principles preclude contracting away merit protections | Howick: Merit Protection Statute preempts such contracts; Ockey should not apply to gov’t-employee contracts | City: relies on precedent permitting contracts that conflict with statutes unless against public policy | Court declined to address this unresolved, important question due to appellant’s procedural default |
| Burden of proof for showing a contract is against public policy | Howick: implied argument that employee should not bear the burden to show contract is against public policy | City: applies Ockey framework requiring a showing free from doubt the contract violates public policy | Court did not resolve who bears the burden—left for future cases because it affirmed on procedural grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Ockey v. Lehmer, 189 P.3d 51 (2008) (articulates two-factor test for voiding contracts as against public policy)
- Lee v. Thorpe, 147 P.3d 443 (2006) (contracts can coexist with conflicting statutes unless they offend public policy)
- Howick v. Salt Lake City Corp., 310 P.3d 1220 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (appeals court held merit status could be forfeited by contract, waiver, or estoppel and remanded for factual findings)
- Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Ivers, 218 P.3d 583 (2009) (mandate rule: appellate mandate binds district court)
- Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600 (2008) (standard of review for summary judgment legal conclusions)
- Gilbert v. Utah State Bar, 379 P.3d 1247 (2016) (will not reverse district court when appellant challenges only one of multiple independent grounds)
- Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 158 P.3d 1088 (2007) (elements required to prove equitable estoppel)
