Howell v. Howell
137 S. Ct. 1400
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- John and Sandra Howell divorced in 1991; the decree awarded Sandra 50% of John’s future Air Force retirement pay.
- John retired in 1992 and Sandra began receiving her 50% share from his military pension.
- About 13 years later the VA found John 20% service-connected disabled; to receive nontaxable disability benefits John was required to waive an equivalent amount of retirement pay, reducing both his and Sandra’s monthly pension receipts.
- Sandra sought enforcement of the original decree in Arizona state court, which held her interest in the pre-waiver amount had "vested" and ordered John to indemnify/reimburse her so she would receive her full 50% without regard to the disability waiver.
- The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether federal law preempts a state indemnification order that restores a former spouse’s lost share caused by a post-divorce VA waiver.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Howell) | Defendant's Argument (Sandra) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a state court may require a veteran to indemnify a former spouse for loss caused by the veteran’s post-divorce waiver of retirement pay to receive VA disability benefits | States can enforce the divorce decree granting a vested share; indemnification merely enforces vested property rights | Indemnification restores the value of the property awarded at divorce and does not divide the waived (disability-related) portion | No. Such state orders are preempted; they effectively award the waived portion and are barred by federal law |
| Whether Mansell v. Mansell is distinguishable because the waiver here occurred after the divorce | Temporal difference supports state authority; parties and court expected full payments at time of divorce | Mansell’s federal preemption applies regardless of timing because the waived portion is excluded from divisible "disposable retired pay" | Mansell controls; timing does not avoid preemption |
| Whether labeling the remedy as "reimbursement" or "indemnification" avoids Mansell | The semantic label preserves state power to make the former spouse whole | Such labels cannot overcome federal exclusion of waived pay from divisible retirement pay | No. Form or label cannot evade federal preemption |
| Whether state courts may account for potential future waivers when dividing or modifying awards | (Implicit) Courts can and should honor prior vested awards | States remain free to consider contingencies in initial division or support calculations | State courts may consider contingencies or adjust support calculations, but cannot order indemnification that effectively awards waived pay |
Key Cases Cited
- Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (federal law precludes states from dividing military retirement pay waived for disability benefits)
- McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (federal preemption of state community-property claims to military retirement pay)
- Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (states may consider federal benefits when setting or modifying spousal support)