Horvath v. Ish
979 N.E.2d 1246
Ohio2012Background
- Horvaths injured when Angel Horvath collided with David Ish on a ski slope at Boston Mills; Ishes moved for summary judgment arguing primary assumption of risk; Horvaths argued R.C.4169.08(C) duties and negligence per se; the court of appeals reversed and remanded; Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C.4169.08/4169.09 do not apply between skiers and addressed common-law standard of care; the case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
- The statutory scheme Speaks to ski-area operators and visitors with reciprocal responsibilities, not between skiers.
- The court determined skiing injuries arise from common-law, not statutory duties between skiers.
- The opinion clarifies that skiers assume ordinary risks of skiing, including collisions, unless the other skier’s conduct is reckless or intentional.
- There is a genuine issue of material fact as to recklessness that precludes summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do Ohio's R.C. 4169.08 and 4169.09 apply to personal-injury between skiers? | Horvath argues 4169.08(C) imposes duties on skiers and 4169.09 makes operators liable for failures. | Ishes contend the chapter applies only to ski-area operators and not to disputes between skiers. | No; chapter does not apply between skiers. |
| What is the proper standard of care between skiers? | Horvath believes common-law duty to refrain from unreasonable conduct should apply (reckless standard). | Ishes advocate no duty between skiers beyond recklessness/intent under primary assumption of risk. | The standard is reasonable care under common law; collisions are not automatic per se. |
| Does violation of R.C. 4169.08(C) amount to negligence per se in this context? | Violation could establish negligence per se given statutory duties. | Statutory duties are general rule-based; violation is evidence of negligence, not per se negligence. | No; violation is not negligence per se; due-care analysis applies. |
| Should the case be remanded for further proceedings on recklessness? | Facts support recklessness; disputed facts require trial. | Summary judgment inappropriate if facts show recklessness. | Yes; remand for proceedings consistent with the reasonable-care standard. |
Key Cases Cited
- Marchetti v. Kalish, 53 Ohio St.3d 95 (Ohio 1999) (recognizes primary assumption of risk limits liability in recreational activities)
- Gentry v. Craycraft, 101 Ohio St.3d 141 (Ohio 2004) (applies assumption-of-risk principles in sports context)
- Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512 (Ohio 1935) (negligence vs. negligence per se distinction in statutory duty)
- Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 (Ohio 1954) (duty and standard of care when statute expresses general conduct rules)
- Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672 (Connecticut 2004) (four-factor test for duty in sports; reasonable-care standard for skiers)
- Rusnak v. Walker, 273 Mich.App. 299 (Michigan 2006) (statutory SASA framework allows recovery if statutory duties violated)
- Dillworth v. Gambardella, 970 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1992) ( Vermont/flow of duty and breach in skiing context)