Horton v. Horton, 518 P.3d 359

Background

Desiree and Andrew Horton married in 1998; both worked for the U.S. government (Andrew: active-duty military; Desiree: teacher with FERS). Divorce proceedings began in 2016.
On June 15, 2017 the parties entered an oral stipulation on the record dividing (among other things) Andrew’s military pension and Desiree’s FERS account; the magistrate said it would “retain jurisdiction” over retirement accounts.
A written Judgment and Decree dated nunc pro tunc to June 15, 2017 was entered Feb 26, 2018. Desiree later sought modifications (including SBP election and treatment of FERS and a stay to reach 20 years of marriage).
At post-judgment hearings the magistrate removed the nunc pro tunc dating, determined SBP was an omitted asset and ordered Andrew to elect SBP for Desiree, and changed/declined some proposed FERS language. An Amended Decree was entered Oct 18, 2018.
Andrew appealed to the district court, which found the magistrate abused its discretion by (1) removing the nunc pro tunc date, (2) ordering the SBP election, and (3) including certain FERS-related language; the district court vacated the Amended Decree and remanded. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Desiree)	Defendant's Argument (Andrew)	Held
Enforceability of oral stipulation	The oral stipulation read in open court should control division of retirement accounts.	The parties’ post-stipulation conduct and lack of oath are not challenged; stipulation governs.	The stipulation—read into the record and accepted by both parties—is binding (parties did not challenge it on appeal).
Removal of nunc pro tunc dating from Original Decree	Removal was necessary to avoid manifest injustice to Desiree (loss of military health/SBP timing); court could relieve on Rule 809 grounds.	Removal lacked stated reasoning and was arbitrary; the decree was intended to be retroactive to the stipulation date.	Magistrate abused its discretion in removing the nunc pro tunc language because it failed to state adequate reasons showing unique and compelling circumstances.
Requirement that Andrew elect Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) for Desiree	SBP is a survivor annuity earned during the marriage and thus a community asset the court could order elected for Desiree.	SBP was not part of the June 15 stipulation and was raised later; magistrate provided no analysis to treat SBP as a community asset.	Magistrate abused its discretion by ordering election of SBP without adequate findings; the issue must be decided on remand with findings whether SBP election is a marital asset.
FERS account language (whether premarital portion was split)	Desiree: premarital accruals in her FERS are her separate property; stipulation intended to split only post‑marriage accruals.	Andrew: premarital portion was allegedly cashed out and repurchased during marriage with community funds, making entire FERS divisible.	Stipulation unambiguously awarded premarital FERS to Desiree and post‑marriage accruals equally; magistrate did not err in rejecting language that would contradict the stipulation.

Key Cases Cited

Stevens v. Stevens, 135 Idaho 224 (2000) (oral stipulations in open court are an exception to the writing requirement for marital settlement agreements)
Taylor v. Chamberlain, 154 Idaho 695 (2013) (nunc pro tunc entries can correct what court intended but failed to do due to oversight)
Robirds v. Robirds, 169 Idaho 596 (2021) (Rule 60(b)/family‑law counterpart requires factual findings and will be upheld unless clearly erroneous)
Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345 (1996) (Rule 60(b) relief requires unique and compelling circumstances)
Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993 (1992) (ordinary contract‑construction rules apply to settlement agreements)
Toyama v. Toyama, 129 Idaho 142 (1996) (ambiguous settlement agreements present factual questions about parties’ intent)
Papin v. Papin, 166 Idaho 9 (2019) (standards for reviewing abuse of discretion in family law)
Smith v. Glenns Ferry Highway Dist., 166 Idaho 683 (2020) (defines nunc pro tunc and limits its use)
Ross v. Ross, 103 Idaho 406 (1982) (quasi‑estoppel in divorce context where party materially benefited from decree)
Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731 (2010) (motion under Rule 60(b) is committed to trial court discretion)