Ross v. Ross

Lucy Hay ROSS, Plaintiff-Respondent Cross-Appellant,

v. ROSS, Defendant-Appellant

John D.

Cross-Respondent.

Luсy Hay ROSS, Plaintiff-Appellant, ROSS, Defendant-Respondent.

John D.

Lucy ROSS, Hay Plaintiff-Respondent, ROSS, Defendant-Appellant.

John D.

Nos. 13260 and 13265.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

April 1982. children,

married in had 1953 and three one years of whom was the time fifteen old at custody was in of the divorce and plaintiff. a specialty physician

Defendant is a practiced and had so for ophthalmology years at date of the approximately ten approx- divorce. In defendant earned imately practice. his medical community accumulated had $617,000. approximately valued March, 1976, Plaintiff filed for divorce in grounds extreme adultery on the of and cruelty. allegation Defendant admitted the allega- of cruelty extreme denied filed a for adultery tion and counterclaim on dif- grounds divorce irreconcilable ferences. sum-

Defendant then moved for only. issue mary judgment on divorce resist the hearing At the did not divorce, argued but rather granting of for divorce partial summary her, than the granted should be rather husband, adultery or grounds on her extreme The court entered what cruelty. “Order for Partial was denominated Sum- Judgment Judgment of Divorce.” mary and marriage The court ordered dissolved, questions but that additional con- cerning property, alimony, the division of custody and and minor child, be trial. court first reserved for granted grounds of irrecon- divorce differences, plaintiff’s cilable but on motion argument changed after further Miller, Dean E. Miller of Gigray, Downen grounds cruelty. to extreme Weston, Caldwell, & for John Ross. D. the par- Plaintiff moved to vacate later Thomas, Kennedy Fred Kennedy, Sas- moved for summary judgment tial and also Hamlin, Boise, ser Lucy & Ross. Hay mistake, basis inad- a new trial on the vertence, neglect or excusable surprise, DONALDSON, Justice. failing to file or authorities affidavits appeals cross-appeals These are summary judg- opposition to the motion rulings various of the trial court in di- defendant, 15, 1976, ment. On October vorce proceeding. part, We affirm in re- motion to opposition plaintiff’s way part, pro- verse in for further remand an af- summary judgment, filed vacate ceedings. On he had remarried. stating fidavit Lucy Hay (hereinafter hearing was held plaintiff) Ross that same date a (hereinafter defendant) John D. Ross were motions were denied.

Trial Plaintiff first asserts that began upon remaining issues entering partial summary erred in March trial following which the divorce, reserving judgment and decree of fact, findings court entered its conclu- additional issues for later trial. In Newell law, sions of The court found decree. Newell, inter alia that had inflicted ex- denied, 871, 77 (1956), cert. 352 U.S. ‍‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍cruelty plaintiff; treme the evi- 95, 1 L.Ed.2d 76 we held that S.Ct. dence was not clear and con- sufficiently provi divorce laws of Idaho make no “[t]he vincing to constitute proof adultery of di interlocutory judgment sion for an defendant; that the community proper- net vorce, However, to Ne- subsequent ...” ty $617,120, value equal was and that an well, adopted the Federal Rules of Idaho fair, division of the property was reasonable 56(a) permits Civil Procedure. I.R.C.P. now just, and and would in the least ad- result of a judgment “upon any parti' all or claim. consequences verse tax parties; to the added.) (Emphasis though Even $30,000 defendant must to pay per year certify partial summary court did not plaintiff (that as alimony for her lifetime judgment required as final as in I.R.C.P. alimony provision was later modified to re- below, 54(b), we for the reasons stated $30,000 quire alimony per year for five following princi hold that nonetheless $24,000 years, $18,000 year, for the sixth estopped ples quasi estoppel plaintiff $12,000 eighth the seventh year, in the alleging from that error occurred $6,000 year, fоr the ninth there- year, and trial of the decree di granting court’s after alimony cease); that defendant vorce. pay plaintiff must per sum $150 Concerning estoppel this Court quasi month for child support; stated, must parties’ sell the residence and their person quasi estoppel, “To constitute interest in a farm partnership pay sought must against estoppel whom the plaintiff $151,000 the sum of approximately himself, advantage for gained have some sales;” “directly proceeds of said disadvantage per to the produced some pay liability that defendant must all tax induced such seeking estoppel, son resulting community from income from the in addition change position; his liability property, together with all tax to allow the it must be unconscionable upon personal income of the defendant estoppel person against whom the “through plaintiff’s the date of divorce which is sought position to maintain a from the all taxes that defendant” and in which he with the one inconsistent might arise from of the residence Mead, the sale Dawson v. accepted a benefit. partnership; KTVB, and the farm that defendant (1976); P.2d 595 Inc. fees, pay attorney plain- must his own 486 P.2d 992 City, v. Bоise 94 Idaho Inc., attorney (1971).” Tommerup tiff of her v. Albertson’s pay the first 1055, 1060 1, 6, fees, the remainder and defendant $6,000. approximately Finally, thereof of filed for the plaintiff who Firstly, it was divorce granted argued she divorce, previously stated tunc ground cruelty pro of extreme “nunc hearing Sep- summary at' the 20, 1976.” September and of record as of that the divorce tember divorce, granted summary judgment we granted. Since affirm This allowed argued by plaintiff, grounds on the this issue is moot.1 estopped by holding plaintiff is decree that the approve of the use of 1. The Court does not granting claiming de- pro concept error in the How- “nunc tunc” in this context. summary judgment. by partial ever, particular cree of divorce in this case it is immaterial unnecessary Therefore, for the trial it was entered the sum- because the trial court terminating marriage to relate mary judgment in the final decree be- Sep- recognizing decree back or divorce division decree tween the this Court is finality (See infra,) validity tember 1976. of that her to be rid of her husband which she sion of the trial court failed to wanted, benefit, and thus conferred a carry proof the burden of of adultery. posi- also allowed defendant his change next Plaintiff asserts that the tri tion in that he on September remarried al court its support. erred in award of child 1976. argues Plaintiff the court award of Secondly, plaintiff advantage has taken per inadequate month was and that $150 provisions judgment. favorable the child award support should have been at large She has received amounts of property, least month. Child $200 repeated has had on the executions issued awards rest in the sound discretion of the $67,- judgment and received approximately trial court and will not be disturbed absent 000 in cash settlement of certain of those E.g., a manifest abuse of discretion. Fuller executions and she seeking is now to main- Fuller, tain position which is inconsistent with Here, considering circumstances of the the one in which accepted she those bene- parties available, and the finances the trial Culbertson, fits. See Culbertson v. 91 Nev. court’s support award child was certainly 230, (1975). 533 P.2d 768 However, considering modest. the finances Willis, This case is similar to Willis v. 93 plaintiff available to the trial court 261, Idaho (1969). Willis, 460 P.2d 396 In concluded, so, well have justifiably and that the attempted wife to vacate the decree parents both werе able to and should partic 60(b). under I.R.C.P. This Court stated: ipate in the of the minor child. We “Additionally, appellant accepted find no abuse of discretion. all the benefits of the divorce decree and Defendant asserts error in por that provisions the of the property settlement tion of the court’s order requiring him to agreement. So far as the record is con- pay plaintiff’s all of attorney fees above the cerned there is no showing she made any $12,583 amount of incurred during the di offer or tender to restore or return vorce property and settlement proceedings. the property funds, or except upon $6,000. This amounted to approximately court ordered recission of agreement the is asserted that the trial court erred in and under such circumstances the court awarding those attorney fees after the com looks with upon disfavor a motion for munity property had been divided. We relief 60(b).” 265, under Rule Id. at 460 agree. P.2d at 400. “We have ruled that the proper manner plaintiff Because initially sought the di- carrying out the mandate of this section vorce and argued that a divorce should be 32-708, is to the satisfy §§ [I.C. 32-704] granted her, and entry of the decree debts, community then tempo- the wife’s enabled did, defendant to remarry, as he rary support fees, and attorney from the and plaintiff took advantage of the property total owned community be- provisions favorable of the decree of di- equitable fore division proeprty.” of the vorce, we hold that it is unconscionable for Mifflin, Mifflin v. her to now posi- maintain an inconsistent (1976) P.2d (emphasis in original). tion, therefore, and estopped she is to deny case, In the instant the trial court erred in its validity. failing to satisfy award of fees attorney Plaintiff also that trial asserts property the total owned the com- court erred in its conclusion the evi munity dividing before property. dence was upon insufficient which to base a finding of adultery by the Di defendant. Defendant also asserts that the trial vorces based on adultery granted ordering $2,000 should be court erred in pay him to only upon very $5,000 clear attorney and conclusive evi by plain fees incurred dence of adultery. E.g., during post-trial Leonard v. tiff motions. Under I.C. Leonard, Idaho 401 P.2d 541 entry judgment, 32-704 after of a § where The record supports before us the conclu- a former wife has access to and control her thе home community proceeds or awarded property, equally share of attorney award of fees cannot be character to the hus- partnership the wife “money ized as an award of necessary practice band. the better would Ordinarily, prosecute enable the wife ... defend suggested by be for the to do as Parker, the action.” Parker v. defendant, the facts circum- but under 1177, 1183 (1975) (empha agree stances in we trial this case sis case, plain In the instant original). here, Where, divorce is court. as decreed tiff, by judgment, had been awarded over th'j cruelty, ground of extreme $300,000 community property, assigned must be community property order, its trial court stated in “substan just. deems proportions judge the trial tial portions plaintiff’s of the share of trial court thus has 32-712(1). I.C. A community property have dividing community wide discretion in been delivered to and are now under the will not determination and its possession exclusive control showing of abuse disturbed a clear absent ” Thus, .... we hold that Simplot, E.g., Simplot of discretion. requiring trial court erred of plaintiff’s attorney fees in had curred after been rendered.2 moving Because asserts Defendant house, not want the South Carolinа and did in its property court made two errors divi the sale supervise would be unable First, he argues sion determination. interest, we partnership the home or the the the parties’ trial court over-valued resi in the trial of discretion find abuse plaintiff An testified appraiser dence. partnership court’s the home and awarding $115,000,while to value of that of defend a ordering then interest to the husband $95,000. valued the home at appraiser ant’s Also, under the property. him to sell the $115,000 The adopted The court the value. case, no abuse of we find facts of this is any property relatively valuation that order the in trial court’s discretion the imprecise and the trial court procedure sum predetermined wife a husband the make the ultimate determination as must receiving her of at proceeds of the to insure conflicting values between submitted property. of the least of the value one-half E.g., Chugg, appraisers. Chugg different v. 45, (1971). 94 891 The valu Idaho 480 P.2d court argues Defendant also in the is ation of the residence instant case alimony to granting abused its discretion erroneous, being supported by not clearly substantial sum plaintiff in view of the substantial, competent, although сonflict division.3 property the awarded to her in evidence, ing, and will not disturbed on addition, alimony he claims In 52(a). appeal. I.R.C.P. consideration inadequate award reflects an was award- of tax because consequences, also asserts error in Defendant 26 U.S.C. years. ed for less ten See than requiring order him to sell trial court’s outcome of 71, (1954). Pending the 215 §§ farming partnership and residence and a paying has been appeal, this $151,765 sale proceeds of the distribute $2,000 stip- pursuant month plaintiff per argues plaintiff. Defendant sales ulation. court should have either divided the Mifflin, supra, issue of dispositive band did not raise the constitutional as to

2. Mifflin v. court; second, community payment hus- resort-to of v. Orr in trial Orr attorney prior appeal; fees incurred to a divorce raised it on band has heretofore not third, decree. not raise and appeal.” Consequently, the husband does do not decide that we 32-706, constitutionality 3. The of I.C. § City Oregon issue. Shortline R.R. Co. based, alimony award 244, Chubbuck, 245 93 Idaho fact, defendant-appel- appeal. In raised on (1970). stated, reply “We the rec- lant in a ord to be brief want clear, first, absolutely that the hus-

411 cumstances, 32-712, I.C. deem it applied The to be we § standard awarding requires district alimony judge desirable to allow the trial to make give to the cor court due consideration his usurping determination rather than parties. relative needs and abilities of both this discretion at level. Mifflin, Mifflin 97 556 Idaho P.2d awarded, alimony The total amount of stated Mifflin 854 As a decision i.e., $210,000, opinion is in our excessive. awarding to a denying alimony party However, plaintiff paying pur- has been “will not be overturned Court in the this stipulation suant order of district Id. at absence an abuse of discretion.” $2,000 per temporary support court month (citing Loveland v. Love P.2d 556 854 during pendency this action and land, (1967)). 67 P.2d entry these until payments may continue After reviewing the record in in the district court. There- judgment this we case find that the trial court abused after, paid pending month awarding $210,- its discretion in plaintiff cease, determination ‍‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍action should 000 in alimony nine-year period over since alimony pursuant and no permanent I.C. showing there was no Alimony need. 32-706 be awarded. not awarded to the wife as a matter of We have reviewed all the other issues right only the discretion trial raised and find that Mifflin, after showing of need. rulings sup- of the trial court are otherwise supra; Wyatt, Wyatt v. ported are error. by the evidence and not in McNett, McNett v. (1973); P.2d 1312 and orders of the court below plain P.2d respects, are all ex- therefore affirmed tiff’s community property share of the cept as indicated above. $300,000. worth over She also testified that her necessary expenses The court below denied ad- approximately were per month. The attorney pursue ap- $875 trial court found vance of fees this college was a graduate, capable peal, finding such an advance not to be obtaining employment with additional edu Although under 32-704. “necessary” I.C. § cation at a approximately $3,600. cost of attorney the final whether determination Thus, while temporary could alimony be appeal fees awarded rests justified plaintiff while going was back to Court, case adopt this I.A.R. we in this school and custody had of minor child plain- court that findings the district who is now of majority, justi it cannot be tiff in her to adequate possession had funds $210,000 fied amount paid over a we prosecute appeal. Consequently, this period. nine-year This is particularly true attorney award no fees under I.C. 32-704. when the trial court found with pru Parker, Parker 541 P.2d 97 Idaho management dent $300,000 of the over Tolman, Tolman (1975); worth of plaintiff assets could live comfort 461 P.2d ably on the income her assets. There in part, The case is affirmed reversed in fore, we reverse trial court’s award of part, proceed- and remanded for limited $210,000 in and alimony remand the dis ings described herein. trict court for it to determine if the division No allowed. costs property “fair equitable” still and of the plaintiff view fact that will not be receiving alimony. SHEPARD, JJ., What have been a and concur. McFADDEN “just equitable division” of the commu BISTLINE, Justice, concurring and dis- nity property judge in the mind of the trial senting: may well have been influenced the addi plaintiff tional which he decreed I. as alimony. permits any The statute divi sion community permanent alimony On of the the matter just trial judge considers under all the cir- award I from the wisdom my bearings take year. Justice ments to of one period Knudson who authored the a court Nielsen, opinion Court’s in Nielsen v. recognized that at the time decree Dr. Nielsen was not well appellant physi- entered was by the final decree in that case was ordered cally or There is no mentally. showing child each of two $100 appellant procure has been able to children, to pay and ordered Mrs. Nielsen employment any ‘during time at alimony $200 month as period hours the are at school.’ These children one year. Mrs. Nielsen challenged ap- adversely children affected may be peal both the amount time limita- the home while appellant’s absence from tion. A unanimous Court Justice through pursuit and in view of employment, responded Knudson to Mrs. Nielsen’s con- children it is ages the tender of said im- tentions as follows: portant what effect would to consider portion findings “The of the court’s alimony in ad- result. To terminate which discloses some extent the rea- showing vance of that circumstances soning of the court in limiting pay- warrant termination would neces- such year ments one is as follows: conjecture.” sarily speculation rest on ‘That the intelli- 585-86, at 629 (em- at gence and education to enable her to phasis added). employment during find and hold applicable logic analysis of that here school, hours the children are persuades it should be control- me that the Court further finds that such em- ling. just as the Court then Particularly, ployment would be her best interest held that it to forecast a terminа- was error standpoint.’ from a mental it error on the tion date of so was year, one many “The record does indicate part adopt court here to district personal appellant’s problems were a re- years. termination nine date of remaining worry- sult of her home and necessarily speculation and resting “on con- ing; the trial court considered that jecture.” speculative Equally would be to her best interest dates the alimony court’s forecast of the standpoint accept employment. mental would be reduced. In considering appellant’s it is contention Accepting fact that saw a note that significance to the trial court at the time alimony need for an award also found: entered, improper decree was it was to ex- ‘That the is at un- present its That years. pro- tend duration for nine employed present and her physical imperative vision made it defendant- best, mental condition is not of the later he would face husband this has been caused in the main —else if he judicata sought res plea bar of by defendant’s conduct treatment court level. modification The at her, thereof, and as a result сlear, perhaps, law is not that all receive, plaintiff is entitled to and the alimony award certainly arguable pay shall to the plaintiff, for a nine permanent was to be intended month alimony sum of as $200.00 granted period, though in- years even period year, beginning a of one for -award should have lump sum form. The June 1963.’ for the two monthly been for a amount adequacy As amount concerns the most, might years, or three at the disagree appel- the allowance we with necessary, with a have then found been lant’s contention. We are not aware an automatic then be proviso that there showing appellant pro- cannot Mrs. Ross’s needs. re-examination children appro- vide herself and the the least should have Monthly alimony at priate maintenance with the allowances on mo- However, made to modification prescribed. subject been under all the cir- Nielsen, As stated party. tion either of this case we cumstances consider to the court “until such as it is shown alimony pay- was error to limit the time that counsel for a longer quite is no in need of the alimo- defendant could for [she] ny or that circumstances and conditions objecting any sugges- distance be heard modification, a pay- warrant defendant, tion that the with whom he has ment should continue.” Id. counsel, oí agreed paying had that much year at 629. One was be too there held to award, permanent alimony and no short a time allowing without for a re-eval- strings appears par- attached. It situation, uation of the and conversely the ties, counsel, agree- an through worked out nine year award in long. this case is too well ment to avoid executions and avoid as There should have been a provision which, as supersedeas the cost of a bond all re-evaluation; earlier without such defend- know, a practitioners of the older makes ant was forced to initiate appeal. this good premium surety companies, out,

As the opinion points Court’s Dr. huge no risk —but can also usually at $2,000 Ross agreed to pay monthly as alimo- if party putting up taxable cost ny pendente lite —while the was prevails appeal. question bond on the A processed out, to test amongst things, other arises as to how much of this is surmise primarily validity alimony award. my part, or how much is inferable from opinion as written lends itself to the the reсord. inference that this was a voluntary agree- parties, represented by both able ment part of the defendant. counsel, seem to me to have understood that certainly is true that agree he did to do it. bond, Dr. post supersedeas Ross could But it is at once seen enigmatic as that he so, that if he did do Mrs. Ross would have would voluntarily agree giving his ex- prevented been on each ac executing $2,000 wife the sum of monthly while $2,500 cruing monthly installment. But awaiting disposition appeal, and at herself, that is not all. would now find She contend, same time has, as he does and non-prevailing appeal, as the as that he should have been pay ordered to premiums sessed as taxable costs the annual alimony. At present presuma- time he bond, supersedeas assuming for the that I bly has $2,000 written forty-eight checks to read the correctly opinion deny Court’s Mrs. amounting $96,000 to a total of Ross— ing any permanent alimony her whatever. —which is almost per- one-half of the total I note Leasing Corp. also that in Industrial manent alimony award. Under the ration- Thomason, 532 P.2d 916 ale today adopted in the Court’s opinion, if Court, on file with the this clerk of another four years elapsed before there was the cost bill shows that a total sum of judgment, the contention that he $1,625 years premiums paid for two should not be obligated to pay any alimony for the supersedeas by appel bond obtained would be rendered moot. 41-2607; lants in that case. See I.C. § The inference to be clearly drawn from American, Inc., Henderson v. Cominco the record is that the defendant reached the agreement with plaintiff (it not a The parties seem to have understood as unilateral beneficience of an eleemosynary well that posted, agree- if no bond were nature) $2,000 and accept the month- bond, ment reached lieu of and Mrs. Ross ly as an alternative being solution to his $2,500 process execution exacted month- faced with writs of every execution as ly Ross, money judgment Dr. placed month him another in debt. invalidated, was later she would have been So agreement viewed the would in this required restitution, to make pay as well as Court nothing be more than a matter of considered, premiums. the bond All passing I have interest. permanent If the alimony concluded as above that it better aside, award is to be set would be majority and a is, the Court for the Cоurt to remain from concern- say that aloof ing would seem agreement to be the for itself with the made only proper forum $2,000 resolution of the pay- parties status of the and the underlying premises there- ments imagine fore, heretofore I made. would which are better known to them and December, fur- alimony from my to the trial court. I do not intend the Court prejudgment remarks to be taken as a ther that defendant would ask Execution, provid- district court resolution on the issue. Rath- Staying for an Order er, I strongly things by May believe that this Court should are done ing all of these not on sparse now a record as to that issue 1978.” $96,000 the status of which has been decide there is say I safe to that believe it is Dr. paid, obligation declare the Ross to reciting the court’s order reason to believe until payments continue is (Dr. defendant agreed that “It was further holding may very entered —which well have Ross) May on or before would “chilling right effect” on his to continue plaintiff the sum pay commence to litigation with to an outcome which he be- $2,000 appeal alimony pending a month as just. fair lieves be for being said due payment with the first agreement which led to oral in-court 1978,” substan- April, strongly the month of entry order in district court stay Dr. Ross that counsel for tiates an inference following contained the recitations which to voluntary his client as a intending was not my mind the view that this Court donor, pay- such rather would make $96,000 ought not concur itself with the Miller, reasons stated Mr. ment for the payments thereby perhaps falling into an court minutes. according — to the erroneous I from the disposition, quote agreement leading to order minutes of the trial court: $2,000 alimony monthly should represented “Mr. Miller to the Court temporary alimony which confused with the intends to immediate- while a divorce action may be awarded appeal in this ly the Court’s decisions the wife provide court to pending district However, matter. in order to avoid the wife) support mon- (who still then a executions, orders, necessity repeated way winds its litigation process while the ey nature, prej- and matters of that without parties divorcing to a final decree rights party, udice of of either appeal marriage. I know of terminating the and without issue prejudice raising any ex- which entitles an statutory provision on at this appeal, willing the defendant is the con- alimony. On temporary wife to to the time to cause thеre to be delivered of this Court trary, prior decisions plaintiff, following property, items of following the attorney’s area of fees Findings as set forth in the of Fact on that a quite make it clear entry of decree Pages 5 and 6: a wife. longer woman divorced is no Cash Value of Life certain, however, is that What Insurance 3,072.00 $ payments monthly alimony status of the Stocks and Bonds in the amount of a matter this is not pending made 23.073.00 Merrill, Credit with Court, this properly before Pierce, Lynch, Fen- issue, it as an accordingly have not declared ner & Smith 1,386.00 we, and nor it. Nor should nor addressed Fidelity Items of Fed- than that the Court’s would I now other Savings (is eral as lend- argued on remand be opinion may plaintiff’s pos- session) this ing interpretation itself to the 30.084.00 the 48 on the status of Court has ruled represented “Mr. further to the Miller $2,000 making such the payments, monthly willing stipulate, Court he is remand. binding of the ease and law defendant, behalf of the the Court is to be should not so be. If pending appeal, can make an Order any permanent here held not entitled alimo- plaintiff, the defendant to the will then $2,000 alimony, defendant month com- ny, the sum of self-determination, or further liti- 1978; have for mencing April, with the month of court, agreement and in district thеir gation That which has been the sum of if to restitution right, any, paid applied the defendant can be the defendant’s the final de- alimony If the awarded payments may for be found to have not been voluntarily made. Other than vote of by majority cree is to be stricken prevailed upon the Court in 1977 pre- Court, judge thereby the trial this legislature 13-220, repeal I.C. that for § any further consideration cluded mer statute that restitu clearly suggested issue, prop- it does not follow that tion is in order been money paid where later be years now four erty division should compulsion under the of a threat of execu The trial litigation. further open laid tion to be issued under a judgment legislature court was entrusted —the judgment having later been found errone In the property. just make a division itself, ous Supreme and that Court appel- this persuading absence of evidence reversing Although can direct restitution. so, and remem- late court that it did not do going long the shuffle of from a estab validi- presumption of bering the attendant rules, pleading lished code to court no rule should be I that that issue ty, agree cannot counterpart seems to have I.C. 13-220 At best it could reopened by this Court. forth, language belched in Radermacher the trial court to do so if authorize the trial Eckert, 531, 123 (1942) P.2d 426 it interwove court will concede reads can clearly rather that a district court with the issues property disposition issue of make restitution in the action on particular alimony entitlement and amount remand, independent or even entertain an conduct in award. The Court’s course of 537, 123 Equally action. Id. at at 428. P.2d at the same striking any alimony, down general unjust clear is that the principles retain all sums allowing time Mrs. Ross to Corpus enrichment as stated in Juris Secun at the same given years, her in the four right dum recognize and Am.Jur.2d proper- rehash of the intimating time that a writ, recover or payments made under than it ty yield her a better may give issue underlying under a threat of the writ —the nothing did before will seem to some be falling. appeal. later short pure mollification —which Court does not blessed itself seem to have good precedent. with a rule which allows it to address the originally Other than that Mrs. Ross above, say issue. As I not do so support provi- alimony, awarded the child parties obviously where the not want did and should also totally inadequate, sion was the Court indulge itself. would be well Perhaps be reconsidered. I agree that award of court’s the Ross wipe the slate clean —reinstate aside; alimony nevertheless, should be set marriage, begin anew. keeping in mind “that the allowance of thereof, alimony and the amount are in the II.

first instance the trial court’s committed to discretion,” Nielsen, at supra, 87 Idaho IN TO RULE VIEWS RESPONSE 394 P.2d at I would on remand direct OF JUSTICE BAKES the district court to now make the re-evalu- matter, legisla- since practical As a present ation as to need and continuing differences gave ture birth to irreconcilable my circumstances and which in conditions divorce, is inevita- grounds a divorce opinion have occurred properly more would For spouse. ble sought by where either time, years ago, two the same instance, of this philosophy observe hindsight plaintiff’s the benefit of into the Ripatti Ripatti, expressed Court as needs now demonstrated and accountable P.2d years experience, after four reconsider to reverse a obliged where the Court alimony the initial award of who husband divorce decree awarded a amount as well. For certain the trial relief, but didn’t such judge, judges, may and other now have ask for want the cаse guidance more than nevertheless felt free to remand this difficult area mandating that was available in when the decree was with practically directions a “no-fault entered. could obtain wife-at-fault divorce” 32-603(8) under I.C. was ments other truly subject contexts —not —which not in effect when the divorce was granted. revision, as intimated in the dissenting opinion. is on this basis that I find Here, an entirely different situation from expressed untenable the view by the dissent Ripatti, it was parties both pleaded who that this Court should hold that an uncerti- prayed for a dissolution of marriage. their partial fied decree does not terminate the Their prayers answered, were and the mar- marriage until all claims in the divorce ac- riage dissolved motion, on the defendant’s adjudicated. tion have'been I am unable to although the wife interposed objection comprehend simple the manner in which a she, husband, not the should be award- decree which marriage dissolves a would be Hence, ed the divorce. there are no rea- in need of revision. asking Parties for and sons, tactics, other than spite and pro- receiving a decree of divorce are entitled to longing agоny grounds where for di- judicial ‍‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍believe that telling document pleaded vorce are by both parties, plead- or them, world, they long- are no ed by one party and by admitted the other. er married is for real and be relied may general experience been, has to the otherwise, upon. To hold suggested, knowledge and observation of practicing at- only would serve to bring the Court into torneys, that a purpose laudable is served disfavor with general public. “Why,” early termination of a marriage asked, will be “does not this decree di- of bickering, deteriorated to recalci- trances, vorce mean what it says, and for what did I bitterness and even hatred. The general my good money”? easy out It is as experience has been that attorneys today are best reach a result which is both legally able to counsel and reason with divorced sound in touch with reality. clients in attempting to work out property dispositions custody and child attorneys Just as new soon learn to tell support agreements. clients, “sure, their that man can sue you;

I win, sue,” so, too, do tend to agree that in order to he not he can be compliance technical with the is true that spouse court’s rules who is awarded a of procedure, decree of finality a decree of divorce which he or she asked for divorce entered on motion does have partial “right” appeal. sum- a so-called mary judgment however, should again, ought be cast in stone Here the Court the entry of the usual caught up sport playing certificate. I be in the with its would surmise that place, 90% to 95% of all own rules. In the first there will not cases stipulate many would to the situations where an will attorney presentation get the divorce allow the client to issue such a involved such a motion, and would again stipulate gambit. happen, to the But if it does a summary entry of the certification, order of dismissal the appeal and mu- should be the swift tually waive any right appeal. disposition. Principles Let me and certain of judi- simply say that my estoppel suggest concern here is not cial reason- with those couples, them, ing few party may one of who mind that a not invoke the relief, prefer hang on to spouse processes acquire the other either court to for the punishment subjec- infliction of then entirely or for other because reasоns which are not tive desire that the relief awarded and legally bona fide or cognizable. I sought delayed see no reason should have been until the gratuitous for a slap par- practice a sound exact time suitable to that simply because of —that withholding an obsession ty desiring to use the rules of the court as applicable leverage. On problems decree as an instrument of largely which are bench, bar, especially self-manufactured that basis the and will occur in an only insignificant our instances, public, number will be little troubled if ever again. opinion today. divorce, spurious ap-

A decree of it be certi- For the reason such whether not, subject fied or dismiss- judg- peal summary is—unlike would be indulged philosophy in the al, is no sub- has forever readily it is seen that there immorality prevail over morality “an intermi- imagined worry stance to an of marriage doctrine common law remaining litiga- (hence our delay” concluding nable in justifi- inviolate). There is no remained ancillary custody, tion on the issues of child has marriage to a why reason the support, property disposition. and Addi- able every married until last stay must tionally, anything gone I am unable to find in bad finally аction has been I.A.R. which issue of the divorce divests the district extreme, the con- to the jurisdiction proceed of to with trial and resolved. Carried remarriages until prohibit view would disposition remaining trary issues. That completely terminat- action was question posed extremely exact to able the divorce deter- time or final elapse appeal Livestock argument Joyce by counsel at oral in ed Delaying appeal taken. Hulet, P.2d 308 mination of Co. v. 102 Idaho dissolving a of a decree legal effect response and elicited the that only be conducive to marriage like to would something answer was he would persons by of illicit alliances No from the establishment purported know. voice bench inclined, and serve then, actually not so and who are provide any thought to answer. I This would be believe, interest whatever. appeal proper continue to so that of a precedent. law and a break with Idaho does not and should bad jurisdiction not divest the trial court of to Suter,1 I did v. in which case As for Suter hear At least that yet issues untried. has to be conceded while it participate, decision should be left the determination to equal a denial of 32-909 worked that I.C. § gratuities of the trial court. The in a dis- also should be noted that protection,2 it that, senting opinion infer a belief until disposing was available alternate route such an is disposed of and finds more and one which problem, of that remittitur, the case does indeed fall into voiding a than does in the courts favor my part, “limbo.” For I fail to understand could have statute. The Court legislative why this would required, especially be can, All then, save the statute. yet in this particular situation. inter- saving judicial necessary that is is separation after judges District are very peo- pretation providing close to the serve, of both ple they whom and accumulations problems earnings and whose each.3 they solve—for the part doing qui- spouses separate most so are the Orr, (Ala.Civ.App. etly efficiently, requiring and without v. 374 So.2d See Orr help 1979) neutrally of this statutes Recognizing they (construing alimony Court. as do marriages do as well as apart come and new to extend benefits to husbands made, Beal, wives); alliances are 388 A.2d 72 only reasonable see also Beal opportunity course of action by (Me.1978). Apparently was that taken herе the Court at judge, presented district which is also taken so rule was not independently other district did not surface judges throughout the state. that time and voiding of disposition I am than the urged unable to it is as a better why understand certain, Harrigfeld if the that we statute. For setting up should be roadblocks to a applied were to I.C. practice which has for over solutions been followed and Orr 32-909, “problem” resolve the this would twenty years, and which has well served the dissenting opinion. seen litigants practitioners. This Court general statutory exception com- Suter, ed the munity property 1. Suter v. 97 Idaho 546 P.2d post that the rule and ruled spouses earnings were to be separation both earnings subject community property as- provided 2. Section 32-909 considered signment. to be her at 1175. and accumulations of separate property were a wife separa- acquired after when community property This exclusion from tion. the Court the exact route taken 3.This post separation earnings wife was of a Court, Harrigfeld District equal in Suter found to be unconstitutional protection grounds. Thus, P.2d eliminat- Court 4Í8 general

As a proposition today’s opinions likely The reader of will jurisprudence, rights оbligations litigants are set as “judicial my estoppel” infer that use of of the initiation of the Al- complaint. phrase, es- evoked the manufacture though trials sometimes far down toppel guise.” My of “chameleonic failure road, the relief accorded is judicial estoppel, earlier elaborate prevailing found entitled occasioned the belief that it a well-rec- (absent the initiation of the action ognized our I principle jurisprudence. supplemental introducing pleadings issues here, applicable continue believe it arising transpired out of events which Am.Jur.2d, referring addition to to 28 Es- thereafter). so, being Such there is no 71, toppel Waiver, (2d 1966). and 74 ed. §§ sound reason awhy spouse, who comes into Church, I v. 76 mention also Loomis Idaho court and a right claims his or her to disso- 87, 94, 93, 561, a (1954), 565 where P.2d of lution the should marriage, be entitled to of unanimous Court said of the doctrine delay procrastinate and and the same judicial estoppel: time claim the monetary benefits which quite “It held that where a generally is may flow hanging spouse the litigant, by of such sworn state- means is, who financially, other than non persona ments, or judgment, advantage а obtains gratis. contrary, spouse On the a such consideration from one he will not party, should be telling understood as court over, thereafter, repudiating allega- such marriage by is turn loose as us can, quickly as you due time settle of and tions and means inconsistent regarding our property differences contrary testimony, per- or be allegations children. logical why There reason a right a or a recovery mitted obtain party allowed to insist that arising against party, another out of the Court confound the holding situation a subject same or matter.” transaction the wife can continue to share in an alleg- Surely ought to be that a increase in marital accumulations while in ing grounds getting for a divorce and one for asking severance of the marital hardly any complain of position cord which umbilically provides very those alacrity with which Court moved. benefits. With respect sincerity of due for the Jus- BAKES, Justice, dissenting: Chief tice expected Bakes’ concern for the demise 54(b), of Rule about which he infers is My primary writing concern in this dis- 7, descend us upon his footnote sent portion majority of worry bench and bar may find that some- opinion plaintiff, which concludеs that what square difficult with the Court’s Ross, Lucy is estopped asserting error disposition of Rule certified with regard to the date at which the com- in Washington Beckley Carriers v. Truck- munity terminated for of division purposes ing, 102 Idaho 624 P.2d 946 partial of property a result sum- wherein dissenting opinion pointed out mary judgment of divorce. Were not for the party who obtained the certifica- estoppel the majority’s bizarre use of in this tion, then, in motion to dismiss ensu- case, infra, I otherwise as discussed could ing appeal challenged validity majority opinion. concur1 in the certification —the gamesman- sort rule ship Fuller, par- this which concern also occurred Fuller (1980) 607 P.2d 1314 ticular is that the trial court refused issue —both cases perhaps being examples genuine the amount to take additional evidence on nullification, eyebrow which raise an earned, might earnings there, here or if ulcer. causing community proper- amount of other ty 32-712, application noted, however, 1. I.C. should be discus concern that the majority prior significant amendments opinion sion in the method those statutes of both the legislative during assessing attorney 32-704 made in all the 1980 of them §§ fees under I.C. -708, pursuant session. division of ty that had accumulated partial case, after the In the community. present the “order summary judgment, but before the final summary judgment judg- partial judgment, earnings so that those and that contained neither a deter- ment of divorce” property could be included in the property just there was no mination that reason recognized division. As in the majority entry judg- nor a direction for delay, opinion, Idaho law did not recognize or au- Thus, 54(b) clearly ment. I.R.C.P. indicates thorize an interlocutory judgment of di- partial that the summary judg- uncertified prior vorce to the adoption of the Federal final, ment was not and therefore did not Rules of Civil Procedure Idaho in 1959. have the force of law. Livestock Co. Joyce Newell, Newell v. 77 Idaho Hulet, (1981); 627 P.2d 308 P.2d With the adoption of Mead, Dawson v. rules, judgments federal such have been While an uncertified sum- permissible, only within the strictures mary judgment on the issue of divorce re- Procedure, ‍‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍the Idaho Rules of Civil trial, moves that issue from it does not particular 54(b), governs I.R.C.P. marriage terminate the until the date of “entry of a one adjudicating the final all of the judgment more but less than all of the claims" at claims between the the parties. par- Since issue. In order to рartial make a summary tial summary judgment in the case at bar judgment a final judgment issue, on any requirements did meet the of I.R.C.P. including divorce, 54(b) I.R.C.P. specifically 54(b), community prop- the accumulation of requires express “an determination that erty continued until the date of the final there just is no reason for delay and ... an judgment.3 express direction for entry judg- The continuing marriage nature of the ment.”2 Absent such determination and direction, following partial summary judgment the of partial summary judgment divorce in “subject particular signifi- this case is of to revision at any time before cance entry judgment light of of the trial court’s order that adjudicating all of the claims and rights judgment final be entered nunc pro liabilities of all parties,” and thus would tunc to partial not have the date of the summary judgment constituted a final of divorce judgment. The purported effect of that would not have terminated the marital order was to relate the property division 54(b) Problems, 2. require- however, I.R.C.P. still contains the same by are not avoided mere ment, but require has since been ly amended to adding 54(b) finality a Rule certificate of 54(b) setting formal certificate forth such deter- partial summary judgment granting such a mination and direction. The use of the word Assuming 54(b) divorce. that such a Rule cer present opinion “certification” in the refers to upheld, Joyce tificate would be see Livestock meeting requirements 54(b) of I.R.C.P. as Hulet, 129, Co. v. 102 627 P.2d 308 Idaho they existed proceedings at the time of the Broekemeier, (1981), Inc., Pichon v. L. J. 99 below. 598, (1978), might 586 P.2d 1042 it well delay litigation. result in an interminable in the If a notice of were filed either By granting partial summary 3. such uncertified entering as a result of the of such a certified judgments divorce, may fostering courts partial summary judgment, the trial court in the a false sense of “freedom.” Par- any jurisdic would then be ousted from further believing they ties are divorced enter into proceed tion to to determine the relationships marriages new or when in fact support rights parties, of the various I.A.R. prior marriage has not been terminated. 13(b) Security Neibaur, First Bank v. Property obligations division and maintenance parties’ 282 subject are also to confusion when a property rights long would be in limbo for as summary judgment of divorce is entered. ultimately as it would take this Court to decide Community property is created the efforts appeal, present nearly years. at three Con parties, obligаtions and marital financial sequently, regardless of whether certified un continue until the divorce is final. See Suter v. not, 54(b) partial summary judg or der Rule Suter, divorce, granting only leaving ments the diffi Thus, despite partial summary judgment property, custody questions cult divorce, obligations marital and the accumula- later, may accomplish apt for little and are community property tion of continue absent a dislocations, good cause severe as this case ais 54(b) Rule certificate. example. all aspects (1975). Merrick, other judgment P.2d 1169 In to September 20,1976, back judgment date of the court entered an amended nunc partial summary judgment.4 pro In the tunc to clerical ab- correct a mistake in the sence of a Rule certification finally judgment. amount of the original terminating time, as of that marriage jury “The case was tried before a however, such improper. action was $5,422.99 special returned verdicts the plaintiff against in his claim the de- An entry judgment pro nunc rep- tunc $7,994.67 fendants and for for the defend- resents “the power of court to amend ants upon against their counterclaim records of its judgments by correcting mis- however, plaintiff. judge, The trial en- therеin, takes or supplying omissions and to ” tered judgment the defendants apply such amendments retroactively .... against in the amount Am.Jur.2d, Judgments (1969) (em- § $8,441.35 rather than the amount However, phasis added). failure of a “[t]he $2,571.68, spe- the difference between the act, action, or its can incorrect cial verdicts.” 542 P.2d at Id. never pro entry. authorize a nunc tunc If a 1170. court does not judgment, render or renders one which imperfect improper, In that the amendment case we permitted power remedy these errors or pro nunc tunc it was clear because that the omissions treating them clerical mis- $2,571.68.5 actual net was for prisions. judicial Omitted actions cannot be merely pro amendment nunc tunc was even supplied, though would have been to make the written record conform with proper the first 1 Free- However, the true court. actions of the instance.....” on Judgments, (5th 1925); man ed. pro present order nunc tunc case see Annot. 19 648 A.L.R.3d Conse- quite permitted different that from under quently, since partial summary judg- the Pearce, 60(a) supra. I.R.C.P. and Merrick was lacking 54(b) certification, ment Rule correcting Rather than the merely record that omission be supplied cannot by latеr an accurately reflect the actual facts of the pro changing order nunc the tunc nature of actions, prior court’s the order pro nunc partial summary judgment. As was purported tunc in this case to create a new stated Black v. Industrial Comm’n of condition, i.e., partial of the summa finality Arizona, 553, 83 Ariz. 317 P.2d divorce, ry judgment changed which both (1957), court do more cannot than to “[T]he the property rights par and status of the make the record correspond the actual ties, but which not previously had been facts.” certified as final the court. by Such action constitutes error. The effect of reversible We have recently power affirmed the pro arbitrarily order nunc tunc was to our courts to pro enter an order nunc tunc deprive plaintiff accounting an within the pursu- context of a motion made portion community property. of the ant 60(a), I.R.C.P. outlines the which procedure for “clerical mistakes” The correcting majority employed ubiqui- has Pearce, in the record. theory estoppel6 Merrick v. tous last resort to de- entry 4.Although months between trial of final did set district court out in its judgment. community property order that “the should be 14, 1977, valued аs close time to March 54(b) part: any par- provides in 5. “If I.R.C.P. date, possible,” ambiguous. trial as the order is judgments ties to an action are entitled to merely is It not clear whether “valued” means against each other such as on a claim and community property as of accumulated counterclaim, cross-claims, judg- upon such or September 21, 1976, shall be valued as of against ments shall be each other and offset 14, 1977, March or whether “valued” also single judgment difference shall be en- for the community property means the inclusion of larger tered in entitled to the favor of the through accumulated March 1977. How- judgment.” ever, clearly the order additional com- excludes munity property eight acquired during the finding of 6. The trial made factual by estoppel. raised the defendant It was not plaintiff’s feat the out that it was her own obviously reading point correct of Rule by stating plaintiff by that “the withheld from her her hus- wrongfully did not receive that advantage provi taken of the favorable from the band. She judgment” event, sions of the judgment and thus cannot partial summary 54(b).7 assert the clear provisions infers, of Rule entry after majority only Culbertson cites majority Culbertson. judgment, only the final and then after 91 Nev. and Wil P.2d 768 having to resort to a writ of execution in Willis, lis v. from her order to obtain husband (1969) its estoppel finding. Both already which was hers. Another “advan- cases, however, of those involved attacks tage” partial summary judgment of the final judgments. Estoppel was not which the the removal majority finds was employed in those cases to establish trial, something issue from divorce finality interlocutory judg otherwise and which plaintiff which the did not want ment. opposed hardly she is an “advan- —which tage.”8 Finally, states that majority The existence of estoppel, quasi, $2,000.00 “has received month equitable, promissory, of some other cha- ap- of this alimony during pendency meleonic guise, requires some act peal” estopped. and therefore should be person being estopped which benefit yields However, benefit was not derived and, to himself conversely, induces some partial summary judgment, or even the part estoppor. detrimental act on the judgment which awarded recognized majority Such in its month, agreement but has its source in an Albertson’s, Inc., citation to Tommerup v. both parties. However, there is nothing majority, apply- in the record obvious that to suрport doctrine, the majority’s ing “quasi estoppel” bald conclusion its fails to has received any distinguish partial summary “advan- between the tage” from the summary judgment. the so- applying The majority asserts has re- “quasi estoppel,” judg- called and the final “[s]he large ment, ceived amounts of property,” but fails which the “advan- so-called appeal. appetite estop- majority John Ross on fallen victim to the voracious has made that factual determination pel. first time on appeal. initially filed 8. While it is true that the estoppel by majority 7. The action taken has action, clearly the divorce the record indicates only require not rendered the certification summary judgment partial that the motion for 54(b) utterly meaningless, ments of Rule but interlocutory for an by order of divorce was made arbitrarily deprived of her defendant, Ross, opposed John and was community property share of the accumulated Furthermore, party by plaintiff. neither during period the fourteen month between the summary judgment, requested partial that the interlocutory partial summary judg uncertified entered, after it was be certified as final. judgment ment which was ren attemрt- in unfortunate action of the defendant dered in this action. With the Court’s decision marriage following ing the uncertified another today, provision the certification of I.R.C.P. summary judgment partial was not the result 54(b) effectively has been eliminated. First plaintiff, inducements held, Broekemeier, this Court in Pichon v. J.L. Inc., failure to re- (1978), caused the defendant’s own interlocutory spect though partial summary judgment nature of the uncertified even summary judgment pursuant 54(b), partial which he himself certified to be final to I.R.C.P. case, Following logic majority, requested. nevertheless was held be. In this partial summary successfully partial any party the Court now holds that a for a who moves judgment pursu judgment which is not summary judgment certified as final treat that is, 54(b) nevertheless, final, uncertified, ant to certainty though hap- I.R.C.P. final. The even if he should which the I.R.C.P. certificate pen get enough fix. Such himself into a bad provide was intended to has been nullified. amorphous clearly a result exceeds even the rule, action, majority’s That has been majority estoppel, claims bounds of which abandoned to an unfortunate a mul union with employing. to be legal titude of other sound that have doctrines tages” flow. If the majority is seri- really “quаsi rule of is estoppel” anything akin to ous applying about “quasi doctrine of recognized equitable estoppel rules of estoppel” to situations where a re- party Anglo- in previously have existed ceives some but not all of the relief to then jurisprudence, gen- American it has its which he is entitled in judgment, a final esis the determination that one appealing then judgment fault, or has come into court with “un- “quasi estopped” to assert error on clean hands.” On the record in this case it is judgment as to that unless he disavows absolutely clear that in an “unclean hands” portions those judgment which were contest the defendant John Ross would lose advantage, to his it has unwittingly made a being hands down. then is the wife Why change appellate radical practice. penalized? explanation other only if

Additionally, Lucy “qua- Ross is estopped unequal application un- Court’s der these facts from arguing error in the si estoppel” suggests rule in this case disposition court’s then property, apply- veiled to circumvent the constitu- attempt ing the same rule of “quasi estoppel” the tional prohibitions imposed by the United John Ross should also be es- Reed, Suрreme States in Reed v. Court topped from appealing the award of alimo- U.S. S.Ct. 30 L.Ed.2d 225 ny Lucy Ross. It was John Ross who Orr, Orr v. 440 U.S. S.Ct. actively sought the by moving divorce 59 L.Ed.2d 306 summary judgment of divorce. estoppel” If majority’s “quasi holding John Ross has benefited from the decree of state, then it going to be the law in this divorce in degree no lesser than did the applied against also be husband plaintiff. John Ross obtained the benefit of Ross, John and the trial court’s being free from his wife so that he could should be affirmed in toto. immediately marry his office assistant. Lucy Ross was disadvantaged in that she

was left age middle after serving as

homemaker for twenty-five almost years to

start from scratch in qualifying herself for

outside employment. She was disadvan-

taged in that she felt compelled by the tragic events surrounding the divorce to P.2d 1135 travel thousands of miles across the country Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, STATE of in an attempt pick up pieces establish a new life. As to the property which the ‍‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍found majority Lucy Ross HUGGINS, Jr., Orval Edward received and which she has taken “advan- Defendant-Respondent. of, tage” the defendant John Ross received No. 13512. an equal amount and has taken “advan- tage” Now, of it. John attempts Ross Idaho. Appeals Court of this appeal to both advantage take May 1982. provisions “favorable of the judgment” and position “maintain a which is inconsistent” Rehearing Aug. Denied 1982. acceptance his of those benefits under the judgment, by seeking to eliminate the

plaintiff’s alimony lifeline. If Lucy Ross is

estopped attacking

order to seek her full share of the communi-

ty property, applying then majority’s rationale,

own why isn’t John Ross also

estopped attacking the alimony provi-

sion of the judgment? If the Court’s new

Case Details

Case Name: Ross v. Ross

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: Apr 28, 1982

Citation: 648 P.2d 1119

Docket Number: 12980, 13260 and 13265

Court Abbreviation: Idaho