336 P.3d 151
Wyo.2014Background
- In 2001 Penrose installed an HVAC system (including a furnace and exhaust pipe) in one unit of a condominium development; installation completed August 2001. The Hornings purchased the unit in 2004.
- Mill Iron (developer) did not obtain final city inspections or a certificate of occupancy until August 2008; parties dispute when the development was "substantially completed."
- In January 2012 the Hornings suffered carbon monoxide poisoning caused by a ruptured furnace exhaust pipe; they sued Mill Iron, Woodcraft (project manager), and Penrose in November 2012. Mill Iron and Woodcraft settled; Penrose remained.
- Penrose moved for summary judgment asserting Wyoming's ten-year statute of repose, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-8-111, barred the suit because Penrose finished its HVAC work in 2001 and the suit was filed in 2012.
- The Hornings argued the repose period begins at "substantial completion" of the overall improvement (the condominium), i.e., when the owner can use the improvement — here when the certificate of occupancy issued in August 2008 — making their 2012 suit timely.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Penrose; the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, holding the repose period begins when the owner can utilize the improvement (the certificate of occupancy date in this case).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the § 1-8-111 ten-year statute of repose begin to run? | The repose begins on substantial completion of the condominium (owner can use the improvement) — i.e., certificate of occupancy (Aug 2008). | The repose begins when the particular contractor substantially completed its component (HVAC) — Aug 2001 here. | Reversed district court: repose begins when the owner can utilize the improvement for its intended purpose (certificate of occupancy date here). |
Key Cases Cited
- Barlow Ranch, Ltd. Partnership v. Greencore Pipeline Co. LLC, 301 P.3d 75 (Wyo. 2013) (rules of statutory interpretation; give effect to plain meaning)
- Covington v. W.R. Grace-Conn., Inc., 952 P.2d 1105 (Wyo. 1998) (definition and scope of "improvement" to real property)
- Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 1991) (purpose of repose statute: limit perpetual liability and allocate risk)
- Gordon v. W. Steel Co., 950 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App. 1997) (contrasting authority where court held repose began when subcontractors finished work; distinguished because Texas statute lacked a defined "substantial completion")