Hoot v. Nye County, Nevada
2:13-cv-02142
D. Nev.Mar 27, 2015Background
- On Jan 17, 2012, Robert Hoot walked alone in camouflage on a deserted dead-end road leading toward a national security site; he was reading a hardcover book.
- Deputy Kenneth Nagy, patrolling the road, encountered Hoot about 1.6 miles from the site; as Nagy’s vehicle approached, Hoot angled into a ditch eight feet off the road.
- The area had a history of unauthorized infiltrations near the site’s gate. There were no other people, vehicles, or structures in sight.
- Nagy stopped Hoot, asked what he was doing, ordered him to stand in front of the patrol car, and requested identification. Hoot asked the basis for the stop; Nagy said walking and reading near the security site was unusual.
- Nagy radioed Hoot’s ID, which came back clear, and then released Hoot. Hoot sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an unlawful stop and a Monell failure-to-train/supervise claim against Nye County.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment; the court evaluated reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances and considered qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nagy had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop | Hoot contends his conduct (walking and reading, 1.6 miles from site) was innocent and did not furnish particularized suspicion | Nagy argues the totality (camouflage, deserted dead-end road toward a breached security site, veering into ditch as patrol approached) gave rise to reasonable suspicion | Court: Stop was supported by reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances |
| Whether Nagy (and supervisors) are entitled to qualified immunity if the stop lacked reasonable suspicion | Hoot argues constitutional rights were violated and immunity should not apply | Defendants argue law was not clearly established for the precise factual scenario, so objective reasonableness protects them | Court: Even if suspicion was lacking, Nagy and supervisors entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law governed this factual mix |
| Whether the Monell claim survives if no constitutional violation | Hoot asserts municipal liability based on failure to train/supervise | County contends Monell claim fails without underlying constitutional violation | Court: Monell claim fails because court found no constitutional violation (or alternatively immunity) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (reasonable suspicion assessed by totality of the circumstances)
- United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (totality approach and avoiding divide-and-conquer analysis)
- United States v. Palos-Marquez, 59 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2010) (reasonable suspicion standard for investigatory stops)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard for discretionary acts)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (objective reasonableness for qualified immunity)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (officers entitled to immunity where reasonable officers could disagree)
