Hooper v. State
838 N.W.2d 775
| Minn. | 2013Background
- In 1998 Ann Prazniak was found murdered; Brian Hooper was tried, convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree murder, and sentenced to concurrent life terms. Hooper exhausted direct appeal and two prior postconviction petitions.
- Hooper’s third postconviction petition (filed 2011) raised multiple claims: newly discovered evidence that Chalaka Lewis confessed (via A.A.), alleged recantations by trial witnesses (L.J., C.B., C.K.), a Brady nondisclosure/payoff claim, and that the trial judge’s law clerk dissuaded a defense witness (T.E.) from testifying.
- The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on some claims (A.A./Lewis confession and L.J. recantation) and summarily denied others as procedurally barred (Knaffla) or meritless; it found A.A. not credible and L.J.’s recantation not genuine.
- The State did not press timeliness (Minn. Stat. §590.01, subd. 4(a)) on appeal; the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory filing deadline is not jurisdictional and the State waived the argument.
- The Supreme Court affirmed denial of the third petition: (1) Lewis-confession evidence failed the Rainer test (doubtful/cumulative); (2) L.J.’s recantation failed Larrison (credibility); (3) alleged law-clerk interference was harmless because testimony substance was admitted through police testimony; and (4) many claims were Knaffla-barred (previously litigated) including the Brady claim.
Issues
| Issue | Hooper's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §590.01 subd. 4(a) time limit is jurisdictional/was waived | Subdivision 4(a) should be treated as jurisdictional or at least considered; petition filed late but merits should be reached | State did not press timeliness on appeal (waived) | Time limit is nonjurisdictional; State waived timeliness; court reached merits |
| Whether newly discovered evidence (Lewis’s alleged confession via A.A.) warranted a new trial under Rainer | A.A.’s affidavit/letter (2009) shows Lewis confessed; qualifies as newly discovered evidence that could exonerate Hooper | Evidence was doubtful, vague, could have been discovered earlier, and was cumulative/impeaching | Denied: A.A. not credible; evidence failed Rainer (particularly prong 3: not credible/doubtful) |
| Whether L.J.’s recantation warranted new trial under Larrison | L.J. now recants his trial testimony that Hooper admitted the killing | State emphasizes prior consistent grand-jury/trial testimony and L.J.’s post-trial convictions undermining credibility | Denied: postconviction court not reasonably well satisfied recantation was genuine; credibility findings upheld |
| Whether law-clerk interference, Brady/payoff, and other claims merit relief or removal of district judges | Law-clerk dissuasion deprived Hooper of witnesses/right to present defense; C.B./C.K. recantations and alleged State promises withheld (Brady); entire Fourth Judicial District must be recused | Clerk interference, even if true, was harmless because substance of testimony was admitted; many claims are Knaffla-barred; recusal of whole bench unsupported | Denied: interference harmless beyond reasonable doubt; Brady and recantation claims procedurally barred; motion to remove judges denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Hooper v. State, 620 N.W.2d 31 (Minn. 2000) (affirming convictions and prior postconviction denial)
- Hooper v. State, 680 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2004) (affirming denial of second postconviction petition)
- State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976) (procedural bar rule for claims that could have been raised earlier)
- Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. 2012) (statutory postconviction time limits are nonjurisdictional and subject to waiver)
- Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1997) (four-part test for newly discovered evidence)
- Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928) (test for new trial based on false testimony)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (prosecution duty to disclose exculpatory evidence)
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (U.S. 1973) (due-process right to present witnesses in one’s defense)
