Hooper v. County of San Diego
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 71
9th Cir.2011Background
- Hooper was detained by a private loss-prevention officer for alleged petty theft at a Long's Drugs in Encinitas on May 9, 2006.
- San Diego Deputy Terrell arrived with a canine, removed Hooper's handcuffs, and prepared to search her car after taking statements.
- Hooper's car keys were given; Terrell found a substance he believed to be methamphetamine and arrested Hooper for possession.
- In a brief struggle on the ground, Hooper jerked her wrist; a German Shepherd bit her head, causing severe scalp injuries requiring skin grafts.
- Hooper pled guilty to resisting arrest under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1). She sued under § 1983 for excessive force and state-law claims.
- The district court granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claim as Heck-barred and dismissed state-law claims; the district court also granted summary judgment against Hooper's claims against Sheriff Kolender in his personal capacity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Heck bars Hooper's §1983 excessive-force claim | Hooper argues excessive force occurred during a continuous arrest transaction, not separable phases. | Defendants contend Heck bars any §1983 claim tied to a conviction under §148(a)(1). | Not barred; Heck does not apply to this §1983 claim. |
| Whether Smith v. City of Hemet doctrine controls | Smith's two-phase approach should limit Heck to only one phase showing unlawful conduct. | Smith supports Heck bar where the wrongful conduct is linked to the arrest phase. | Smith's dicta was superseded by Yount; Heck applies differently. |
| How Yount v. City of Sacramento affects Heck in this context | Yount allows a §148(a)(1) conviction even if some conduct in a continuous transaction was unlawful, so Heck may not bar the §1983 claim. | State law interpretation governs, but Heck as limited by Yount could bar claims tied to unlawful arrest elements. | Yount controls; a conviction under §148(a)(1) does not bar a §1983 claim when claims involve different actions in a continuous transaction. |
| Whether Hooper’s §1983 claim is based on the same conduct as the §148(a)(1) conviction | Hooper's §1983 claim rests on excessive force during an arrest, separate from the pre-arrest conduct supporting the conviction. | The conduct is part of the same continuous transaction. | Not the same; the excessive-force claim can proceed without invalidating the conviction. |
| Scope of state-law claims and district court remand | California analogues to Heck may bar state-law claims identically to §1983. | State-law Heck analogues should be applied; remand appropriate for California law issues. | Remand for reconsideration of state-law claims consistent with Yount and this opinion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1994) (federal bar to §1983 claims that would imply invalidity of a conviction)
- Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (two-phase framework for §148(a)(1) analysis; dicta later superseded)
- Yount v. City of Sacramento, 43 Cal.4th 885 (Cal. 2008) (conviction valid under §148(a)(1) despite some unlawful conduct in a continuous transaction)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (reasonableness standard for excessive force under Fourth Amendment)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (U.S. 2007) (no special rule for deadly force; focus on reasonableness)
- Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal.App.4th 1401 (Cal. App. 2002) (interpretation of §148(a)(1) regarding phase distinctions)