Honie v. State, 342 P.3d 182

Background

In 1999 Taberone Dave Honie was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death; conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
Crime involved brutal killing and sexual mutilation of victim Claudia Benn; evidence included victim injuries, child D.R.’s genital abrasions, blood on defendant, and defendant’s admissions to police and to a forensic psychologist (Dr. Cohn).
At trial defense conceded guilt and focused on mitigation; defendant waived jury sentencing and was sentenced to death by the judge after mitigation evidence from Dr. Cohn.
Honie filed a postconviction petition alleging multiple Strickland-style ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims and sought additional PCRA funding; postconviction court denied most claims and refused extra funds, then granted State summary judgment after trial-counsel affidavit.
Honie filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion arguing postconviction counsel was ineffective because the court denied funds; the court denied relief and Honie appealed; appeals were consolidated.
Supreme Court of Utah affirmed: no genuine factual dispute on ineffective-assistance claims, no abuse in denying additional funding under amended PCRA, and Rule 60(b)(6) relief inappropriate absent a complete default like in Menzies.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were trial counsel's strategic choices and mitigation investigation ineffective?	Honie: counsel conceded guilt too early, relied improperly on single expert, failed to investigate FAS/brain damage/polysubstance abuse and other mitigation.	State: counsel reasonably relied on qualified expert (Dr. Cohn), conducted adequate investigation and made defensible strategic concessions.	Held: No. Counsel’s investigation and strategies were reasonable under Strickland; summary judgment affirmed.
Was counsel ineffective for not pursuing a voluntary-intoxication defense or for failing to preserve intoxication evidence?	Honie: evidence of drinking/drugs and conduct suggested intoxication sufficient for defense; counsel should have done retrograde extrapolation and objected to evidence destruction.	State: evidence did not show intoxication prevented requisite mens rea; witnesses and defendant’s statements show he knew and intended to kill.	Held: No viable intoxication defense; counsel not unreasonable and no prejudice from any alleged failures.
Was counsel ineffective for admitting defendant’s inculpatory statements (police and Dr. Cohn) and advising waiver of jury at sentencing?	Honie: admissions were highly prejudicial and Miranda issues; waiver advice was inadequate and not knowing/voluntary.	State: admitting statements was strategic to show remorse; waiver was strategic and informed; judge indicated measured approach to death penalty.	Held: Strategic admissions and waiver were objectively reasonable; waiver was knowing and voluntary; summary judgment affirmed.
Did the postconviction court abuse discretion by denying additional PCRA funding and by denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief based on postconviction counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness?	Honie: denial of funds crippled postconviction counsel and rendered representation ineffective, justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6).	State: Honie failed to show additional funds likely would develop evidence supporting relief; Rule 60(b) is inappropriate absent complete default.	Held: Denial of funding was not an abuse of discretion (no good-cause showing); Rule 60(b)(6) relief denied because counsel’s performance did not amount to the complete default required by Menzies.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel not required to unearth every conceivable mitigation; strategic choices after investigation are entitled to deference)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (strategic trial decisions receive heavy deference on habeas review)
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (concession strategy can be reasonable in capital cases)
Taylor v. State, 156 P.3d 739 (Utah 2007) (review of counsel’s mitigation investigation under Strickland)
Archuleta v. Galetka, 267 P.3d 232 (Utah 2011) (counsel may reasonably rely on qualified experts; limits on mitigation funding claims)
Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief appropriate where postconviction counsel’s conduct amounted to complete default)
Kell v. State, 285 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2012) (limits Menzies to exceptional cases; Rule 60(b) improper when case was litigated and appealed)