Honeyfund.Com Inc v. Governor, State of Florida, 94 F.4th 1272

The State of Florida enacted the Individual Freedom Act ("Stop W.O.K.E. Act"), banning mandatory workplace trainings that endorse certain viewpoints about race, sex, color, or national origin.
The Act specifically prohibits employers from requiring employees to attend sessions that "espouse, promote, advance, inculcate, or compel" a set list of views related to identity topics, but allows sessions with alternative or "objective" presentations.
Plaintiffs (Honeyfund, Primo Tampa, and Whitespace Consulting) want to hold mandatory diversity trainings and claim the law violates their free speech rights.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction against the Act’s workplace provision, finding it unconstitutionally vague and an unlawful content- and viewpoint-based restriction.
Florida appealed, arguing the law regulates conduct, not speech; the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the injunction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Act imposes a content- and viewpoint-based restriction on speech in violation of the First Amendment	The law targets speech and penalizes certain viewpoints, in violation of First Amendment protections.	The law regulates conduct (mandatory meetings), not speech, and serves anti-discrimination goals.	The law is a direct, content- and viewpoint-based speech restriction, triggering strict scrutiny.
Whether the Act can be justified under strict scrutiny	No compelling interest, and law is not narrowly tailored—offends free speech regardless of offensiveness.	The law protects unwilling listeners from discrimination and is narrowly focused on mandatory attendance.	Not justified; banning speech on certain topics is overbroad and not narrowly tailored.
Whether alternative characterizations (as conduct regulation) defeat First Amendment review	The conduct banned (mandatory meetings) is inseparable from the targeted speech.	The restriction is on the act of meeting, not speech content.	Speech content determines application, so First Amendment scrutiny applies.
Whether preliminary injunction requirements are met	Ongoing First Amendment violation is irreparable harm and injunction is warranted.	No legitimate government interest is harmed by enforcement, so no injunction needed.	All prerequisites for a preliminary injunction satisfied due to ongoing constitutional harm.

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (laws that are content-based on their face or by purpose are presumptively unconstitutional)
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (speech cannot be regulated as conduct when the only conduct is communication itself)
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (new categories of unprotected speech can’t be legislatively created)
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (viewpoint-favoring restrictions violate the First Amendment)
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (broad prophylactic restrictions on speech are disfavored, even in the face of compelling interests)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (robust debate on public issues is the core of First Amendment protections)
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (protects even offensive or outrageous speech in public debate)
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (laws restricting speech because of content or viewpoint are subject to heightened scrutiny)