Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus
160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609
Cal. Ct. App.2013Background
- Appellant Nicholas Honchariw (trustee/applicant and acting counsel) submitted a vesting tentative map to Stanislaus County to subdivide 33.7 acres into residential parcels; the Board disapproved the application without making written findings required by Gov. Code § 65589.5(j).
- In a prior appeal, this court held the project was a "proposed housing development project" under § 65589.5(j) and directed the superior court to issue a writ commanding the Board to reconsider and make required findings; the Board later approved the application on reconsideration.
- Honchariw moved for attorney fees under Gov. Code § 65589.5(k), which mandates that the court “shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of suit to the plaintiff or petitioner who proposed the housing development ….”
- The superior court denied fees, concluding the phrase "the housing development" was ambiguous and, based on legislative history, limited to affordable housing or emergency shelter projects; Honchariw appealed the denial.
- The Court of Appeal conducted independent statutory construction, found § 65589.5(k) ambiguous, examined the legislative history of AB 369 (which added the fee provision), and concluded the attorney-fee entitlement is limited to affordable housing developments; it affirmed the denial of fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 65589.5(k)’s attorney-fee phrase "the housing development" covers non-affordable residential projects | Honchariw: wording is broad; "housing development" includes his subdivision project so fees must be awarded | County: provision was intended to aid affordable housing developers; fees limited to affordable housing/emergency shelters | Fee award limited to affordable housing/emergency shelters; fees denied for Honchariw’s non-affordable project |
| Whether the undefined term "housing development" should be read as the defined statutory term "housing development project" | Honchariw: statute should be read broadly to include projects like his | County: legislative history and context show a narrower intent; Legislature did not use the defined term so limitation applies | Court rejects equating the undefined term to the defined term; ambiguity resolved by context and history favoring limitation |
| Role of the definite article "the" in § 65589.5(k) (i.e., whether it narrows coverage) | Honchariw: "the housing development" refers generically to the project at issue | County: "the" points to a specific type of development — the one described in prior sentence (affordable housing/emergency shelter) | "The" indicates a specific development tied to the court’s order (which, per statute and history, applies to affordable housing/emergency shelters) |
| Use of legislative history to resolve ambiguity | Honchariw: legislative materials emphasize housing broadly; statute should be generous | County: AB 369 history shows intent to assist affordable housing developers wrongfully denied by local agencies | Court: legislative history (AB 369 reports/analyses) demonstrates intent to limit fee awards to affordable housing; resolves ambiguity in favor of County |
Key Cases Cited
- Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus, 200 Cal.App.4th 1066 (Cal. Ct. App.) (prior decision holding project was a "proposed housing development project" under § 65589.5(j))
- Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal.3d 727 (Cal. 1988) (statutory language must be read in context of whole scheme)
- Garcia v. McCutchen, 16 Cal.4th 469 (Cal. 1997) (words of statute given ordinary meaning as starting point)
- Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1983) (literal reading should not defeat statute’s purpose)
- Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 7 Cal.4th 561 (Cal. 1994) (avoid absurd consequences in statutory construction)