Home Care Association of America v. Weil
78 F. Supp. 3d 123
D.D.C.2015Background
- Plaintiffs (trade associations for third-party home care providers) challenged the DOL’s October 2013 revisions to 29 C.F.R. Part 552, specifically the narrowed definition of “companionship services” at § 552.6, which would limit the care component and cap care at 20% of weekly hours.
- The plaintiffs previously succeeded in vacating the DOL’s separate third-party employer exemption rule (Dec. 22, 2014); that decision made the § 552.6 definition directly consequential to plaintiffs’ members.
- DOL’s longstanding 40-year regulatory definition had allowed companionship services to include care and limited household work; the new rule redefined companionship as primarily “fellowship and protection” and tightly limited care to attendant, incidental tasks and to 20% of total weekly hours.
- Plaintiffs moved for emergency injunctive relief to stay the new definition; the court issued a temporary restraining order and consolidated the preliminary injunction with merits review, treating the motion as summary judgment on the administrative record.
- The court applied Chevron step-one statutory construction and concluded Congress had spoken: the exemption applies to services for persons “unable to care for themselves,” which necessarily includes meaningful care; the DOL’s 20% cap and narrowing were “manifestly contrary to the statute.”
- Result: plaintiffs’ motion granted; the DOL’s revised § 552.6 companionship-services regulation (78 Fed. Reg. 60,557) is vacated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the DOL’s narrowed definition of “companionship services” lawfully interprets 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) | The statute exempts workers who provide care to those "unable to care for themselves," so the regulatory definition must meaningfully include care; DOL’s rule effectively removes care and thus conflicts with the statute | DOL argues it has delegated authority to define the term and its interpretation (emphasizing fellowship/protection like babysitting) merits deference | Court: Chevron Step 1 — Congress spoke clearly; the regulation is contrary to the statute and vacated |
| Whether limiting care to tasks attendant to fellowship/protection and capping care at 20% of hours is reasonable | Such a strict quantitative limit defeats the statutory purpose and makes the exemption meaningless for those who need regular care | DOL relied on precedent uses of 20% in other FLSA regs and argued rulemaking rationale supports the limit | Court: 20% cap is arbitrary vis-à-vis statutory text and intent and thus invalid |
| Whether long-standing agency practice and legislative history support DOL’s change | Plaintiffs point to 40 years of consistent regulatory interpretation and lack of Congressional revision as evidence supporting broader definition | DOL cites some legislative references (e.g., analogy to babysitters) and asserts regulatory authority to revise definitions | Court: Congressional acquiescence to the longstanding interpretation and absence of statutory change support plaintiffs; agency may not rewrite the exemption by regulation |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (establishing two-step deference framework for agency interpretations)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (agency interpretive deference depends on statutory indicators of delegated authority)
- Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (addressing FLSA companionship-services issues)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard)
- Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (congressional silence can be evidence of acquiescence to longstanding agency interpretation)
- NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (same principle regarding congressional inaction and agency interpretation)