Home Care Association of America v. Weil
76 F. Supp. 3d 138
D.D.C.2014Background
- The FLSA (1938) requires minimum and overtime wages; 1974 Amendments extended protections to domestic service employees but carved out exemptions for "any employee" who provides "companionship services" and for "live-in" domestic employees. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15), (b)(21).
- DOL regulations promulgated in 1975 interpreted those exemptions to include employees employed by third-party agencies (not only by the household), a position upheld by the Supreme Court in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke.
- In 2013 DOL issued a Final Rule (to take effect Jan. 1, 2015) that: (a) revised definitions of domestic service terms, and (b) in a separate provision excluded third‑party employers from claiming the companionship and live‑in exemptions (the "Third Party Employer" regulation).
- Trade associations representing third‑party home‑care employers sued under the APA challenging the new third‑party employer regulation as inconsistent with the statute and arbitrary and capricious; plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment and DOL moved to dismiss or for summary judgment.
- The district court held that Chevron Step 1 resolves the case in plaintiffs' favor: Congress unambiguously covered "any employee" providing companionship or live‑in services regardless of who employs them, so DOL lacked authority to narrow exemptions based on employer status; vacated the DOL Third Party Employer regulation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOL's Third Party Employer regulation is consistent with the FLSA exemptions | The statutory text "any employee" plainly covers employees providing companionship or live‑in services regardless of who employs them; DOL may not rewrite exemptions by excluding third‑party employers | DOL has delegable definitional and implementation authority and its rule is a reasonable interpretation entitled to Chevron deference | Court: Chevron Step 1 — statute unambiguous; DOL rule conflicts with statutory text and is invalid; rule vacated |
| Whether Long Island Care v. Coke forecloses plaintiffs' claim | Coke only upheld the earlier regulation interpreting definitional terms; it did not authorize DOL to exclude third‑party employers by rule | DOL contends Coke validated DOL's regulatory approach and its authority | Court: Coke does not address or authorize this novel rulemaking; it does not foreclose the challenge |
| Whether congressional inaction supports DOL's change | Plaintiffs: repeated Congressional consideration of repeal without enactment supports retaining longstanding interpretation | DOL: (implicit) Congress's lack of action does not foreclose regulatory change | Court: Congressional revisitation without change is persuasive evidence that the longstanding administrative interpretation reflects congressional intent; favors plaintiffs |
| Whether the court should reach arbitrary-and-capricious claim | Plaintiffs also argued the change was arbitrary and capricious; court did not decide because statute resolved the case at Chevron Step 1 | DOL argued notice-and-comment and reasons suffice to uphold rule under APA | Court: Did not reach APA/Arbitrary-and-Capricious analysis because it resolved the case on statutory grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretation)
- Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (upheld earlier DOL regulation interpreting companionship exemption)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (deference depends on delegation and whether agency action has force of law)
- Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (statutory interpretation must account for context, structure, and purpose)
- MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (agencies bound by means Congress prescribed)
- Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (congressional failure to revise longstanding agency interpretation can be persuasive)
- NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (same principle regarding congressional acquiescence)