Holton v. Dep't of the Navy
884 F.3d 1142
Fed. Cir.2018Background
- Scott Holton, a supervisor rigger at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, supervised a crane team moving large submarine modular units when the crane boom struck Building 343, causing >$10,000 in damage.
- Navy investigators, relying on a "crane team" doctrine (shared responsibility for safety) and a Police Desk Journal, authorized post-accident drug testing of the entire crane team.
- Holton was orally notified, provided a urine sample the same day, and received written notice two days later; his sample tested positive for marijuana well above the cutoff.
- The Navy proposed and then removed Holton; he appealed to the MSPB, which upheld removal; the Board found the test proper and any procedural notice error harmless.
- Holton petitioned for review to the Federal Circuit, challenging the reasonableness of suspicion for testing, the Navy’s team-testing approach, lack of pre-test written notice, adequacy of the police report basis, and potential decisional bias by officials who authorized the test.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether post-accident drug test satisfied Fourth Amendment/objective reasonable-suspicion standard | Holton: No reasonable suspicion he caused or contributed; he had delegated control and was ~150 yards from crane | Navy: Holton was the supervisor with duty for overall safety, briefed crew, still responsible; objective circumstances justified suspicion | Held: Reasonable suspicion existed based on Holton’s supervisory role and duties; testing constitutional and regulatory-compliant |
| Validity of testing entire crane team under “crane team” concept | Holton: Team-testing improper because individualized suspicion lacking; he was not actively handling crane | Navy: Team concept assigns shared responsibility; testing all involved is justified under Skinner-like framework for team responsibility | Held: Team approach permissible here because objective facts supported suspicion as to supervisor and team members; test consistent with Skinner standards |
| Failure to provide written notice before test (procedural/regulatory error) | Holton: Regulation requires written notice before testing; lack may have affected his choice to submit | Navy: Oral notice plus existing policy knowledge minimized privacy intrusion; written notice aim is practical (presence/deferral), not to allow refusal | Held: Delay in written notice was harmless error that did not prejudice Holton’s rights or change test outcome |
| Alleged bias because same official authorized test and decided removal | Holton: Decision-maker who authorized test was same who removed him, creating conflict/prejudice | Navy: Law does not presume incapacity to reconsider; supervisor can change position after hearing employee | Held: No presumption of bias; record does not show prohibited decisional conflict |
Key Cases Cited
- Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (warrantless workplace drug testing must be reasonable under Fourth Amendment)
- Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding post-accident drug testing regimes; reasonable-suspicion and "test-all-involved" frameworks)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (objective standard governs reasonableness of searches; subjective intent of official irrelevant)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (reasonable-suspicion inquiry is objective and based on information available when decision made)
- Garrison v. Dep’t of Justice, 72 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reasonable-suspicion analysis focuses on facts known to supervisor at decision time)
- DeSarno v. Dep’t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (absence of presumption that proposing official cannot impartially decide removal after hearing employee)