Holly Anderson v. Connie Sutton
17-3106
| 6th Cir. | Nov 17, 2017Background
- On June 13, 2012, Connie Sutton, the sole corrections officer on duty in an overcrowded Portage County Jail unit, engaged in a physical altercation with inmate Holly Anderson; the encounter was captured on video.
- The video shows mutual insults, pushing, a brief fight in which both threw punches, Sutton wrestled Anderson to the ground, and Sutton twice sprayed Anderson with OC (pepper) spray while Anderson was on the ground or kneeling and not actively resisting.
- Sutton was placed on leave, later fired, and convicted in Ohio state court of aggravated felonious assault; the criminal jury rejected her justification defense.
- Anderson sued Sutton and the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Sutton counterclaimed against the County seeking indemnification and a paid legal defense under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(A)(1) (duty to defend when employee acted in good faith and not manifestly outside scope).
- The district court denied the County’s summary-judgment motion and, after a bench trial, found Sutton acted in good faith to subdue an aggressive inmate and ordered the County to provide a defense.
- The Sixth Circuit majority reversed, concluding the video showed Sutton’s two pepper-spray applications were gratuitous and retaliatory (bad faith), so the County had no duty to defend; Judge White dissented, arguing the district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and bad faith requires evidence of sinister motive beyond excessive force.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether County had duty to defend Sutton under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(A)(1) | Sutton acted in good faith and within scope while subduing an aggressive inmate; defense required. | Sutton acted in bad faith when she gratuitously pepper-sprayed a non-threatening, prostrate inmate; no duty to defend. | Reversed district court: County had no duty to defend because the video shows gratuitous, retaliatory pepper-sprays indicating lack of good faith. |
| Whether Sutton’s use of OC spray was an attempt to subdue or to punish | Sutton: sprays were necessary to control/subdue Anderson after resistance and to complete incapacitation. | County: sprays occurred when Anderson was not a threat and after she was subdued, indicating punishment/retaliation. | Majority: sprays were unnecessary and punitive; not in good faith. Dissent: reasonable inference sprays could be defensive; district court’s finding not clearly erroneous. |
| Standard of review for district court factual findings | N/A (appellee relies on district court’s credibility determinations) | Appellant argues appellate reweighing of video warranted reversal. | Appellate rule: factual findings reviewed for clear error; majority nonetheless found clear evidence the district court erred re: good faith. |
| What constitutes bad faith under Ohio law for duty-to-defend | Excessive or gratuitous force can show bad faith when it reflects punishment/retaliation rather than a job-related act. | Bad faith requires a dishonest purpose or sinister motive beyond mere excess; excessive force alone may not suffice. | Majority treated gratuitous spraying as evidence of bad faith; dissent emphasized Ohio precedent requiring evidence of ill will or ulterior motive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Max Trucking, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 802 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for mixed factual-legal findings)
- Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564 (U.S. 1985) (clear-error standard for factual findings)
- Whaley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 752 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 2001) (duty-to-defend determinations are fact-sensitive)
- Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dep’t, 639 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio 1994) (framework for employee immunity and bad-faith analysis)
- Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. New England Ins. Co., 720 N.E.2d 495 (Ohio 1999) (bad faith requires dishonest purpose or ulterior motive)
- Thomas v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehabilitation & Corrections, 548 N.E.2d 991 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (excessive force alone does not necessarily establish malice or bad faith)
- Martin v. Cent. Ohio Transit Auth., 590 N.E.2d 411 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (mistakes in judging aggression can occur; not every excessive-force incident implies bad faith)
- United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1999) (deference to district court credibility findings)