556 S.W.3d 46
Mo. Ct. App.2018Background
- On Feb. 13, 2014, Stratman stopped in the center lane of I‑435 after his car died; he did not use hazard lights. Brown, a commercial truck driver, struck Holdeman from behind; Holdeman was rendered paraplegic.
- Holdemans sued Stratman, Brown, and Brown’s employer C&G Express; jury found Stratman 99% at fault, Holdeman 1%, Brown/C&G 0%, and awarded large damages to the Holdemans.
- Stratman appealed, raising five evidentiary errors: exclusion of settlement evidence, limitation on use of Brown’s failed post‑accident drug test, exclusion of a non‑retained expert as protected by work‑product, and admission of new economic expert opinions.
- Trial court largely excluded settlement agreements (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.065) and limited other evidence; it allowed Liggett (economist) to testify regarding future lost income based on other experts’ opinions.
- Appellate review applied abuse‑of‑discretion standard for evidentiary rulings and outcome‑determinative prejudice for reversal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Holdemans) | Defendant's Argument (Stratman) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of settlement agreements to impeach plaintiffs’ liability expert | Settlement evidence irrelevant; prejudicial; exclusion proper to protect jury from unfair inference | Semke knew of settlements; jury should see settlements to assess bias and credibility | Exclusion affirmed: no offer of proof showing relevance; risk of prejudice outweighed tenuous impeachment value |
| General exclusion of settlements (Mary Carter concern) | Settlements were confidential but did not distort process; exclusion proper absent distinctive distortions | Settlements made Brown a non‑adversary; nondisclosure distorted adversarial process and required disclosure | Exclusion affirmed: not a Mary Carter‑type agreement and trial court reasonably balanced disclosure against prejudice |
| Use of Brown’s failed post‑accident drug test | Voir dire mention was proper to expose juror bias; test still limited to impeachment | Voir dire opened the door to broader use; test relevant to fault and expert credibility | Limitation affirmed: court properly limited drug test to impeachment of Brown’s deposition; voir dire did not expand admissibility |
| Exclusion of Stratman’s non‑retained expert (McKinzie) | C&G waived work‑product by permitting contact; testimony was non‑retained and known to parties | McKinzie’s opinions were C&G consultant work product and Stratman failed to update interrogatories causing surprise | Exclusion affirmed: court reasonably found work‑product protection and prejudice from Stratman’s failure to disclose |
| Admissibility of updated lost income opinions by Holdemans’ economist (Liggett) | Liggett’s changed figures were disclosed and premised on other experts’ opinions; no unfair surprise | New opinions were undisclosed, lacked foundation, and prejudiced Stratman | Admission affirmed: Stratman had pretrial notice that Liggett’s figures depended on other experts; methodology unchanged and changes reduced damages |
Key Cases Cited
- McGuire v. Kenoma, LLC, 375 S.W.3d 157 (Mo. App. 2012) (deferential review of evidentiary rulings)
- Lewellen v. Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. banc 2014) (broad trial court discretion on evidence)
- Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. banc 1998) (Mary Carter agreements and disclosure balancing test)
- Lozano v. BNSF Ry. Co., 421 S.W.3d 448 (Mo. banc 2014) (offer of proof requirements to preserve excluded evidence)
- Mengwasser v. Anthony Kempker Trucking, Inc., 312 S.W.3d 368 (Mo. App. 2010) (settlement evidence generally inadmissible as prejudicial)
- Kroeger‑Eberhart v. Eberhart, 254 S.W.3d 38 (Mo. App. 2007) (logical and legal relevance balancing test)
- Secrist v. Treadstone, LLC, 356 S.W.3d 276 (Mo. App. 2011) (limits on admitting post‑accident drug tests without proof of impairment)
- Saint Louis Univ. v. Geary, 321 S.W.3d 282 (Mo. banc 2009) (no prejudice where excluded evidence is cumulative)
- Williams v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 854 (Mo. App. 2009) (reversal only if improper evidence was outcome‑determinative)