Hodges v. District of Columbia
959 F. Supp. 2d 148
D.D.C.2013Background
- Hodges was a Supervisory Auditor for the D.C. Office of the Inspector General beginning in 2008 and developed significant lumbar problems in 2010 (disc herniation/bulge, radiculopathy) that limited sitting, walking, sleeping, and concentrating.
- His treating chiropractor imposed work restrictions (complete restriction for July 22–27, 2010), prescribed multiple treatments over weeks, and indicated intermittent/part-time work and absences were necessary.
- Hodges requested leave without pay and short-term disability; management denied LWOP, offered limited accommodations (stand/stretch breaks; no lifting over 5 pounds), and placed Hodges AWOL effective August 16, 2010.
- Inspector General Willoughby terminated Hodges effective September 10, 2010, citing AWOL as the disciplinary reason. Hodges filed administrative complaints and then sued under the ADA, the DCHRA, and the FMLA in Superior Court; the case was removed to federal court.
- The District moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (and sought summary judgment on DCHRA unliquidated damages). The court accepted Hodges’s factual allegations as true for pleading-stage review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hodges alleges a “disability” under the ADA/DCHRA | Hodges claims his lumbar impairment substantially limited major life activities (sitting, working, sleeping, walking, concentrating) and lasted weeks–months | District argues the condition was temporary/short-term and therefore not "substantially limiting" under pre-ADAAA case law | Court: ADAAA/regulations apply (2010); pleadings suffice to allege a disability — motion to dismiss denied |
| Whether the District refused reasonable accommodation | Hodges says offered measures were insufficient and sought modified schedule/telecommuting | District contends its offered breaks and lifting limit constituted accommodation | Court: Reasonableness of accommodation is fact-specific; not resolvable on motion to dismiss — issue remains for later proceedings |
| Whether Hodges had a “serious health condition” under FMLA (interference/retaliation) | Hodges points to >3 consecutive days’ incapacity (July 22–27), multiple treatments within 30 days, and physician’s certification that treatment and reduced schedule were necessary | District contends no inpatient care and argues plaintiff did not show >3 days’ incapacity or continuing treatment | Court: Allegations suffice to plead FMLA "serious health condition" via incapacity and treatment; dismissal denied |
| Whether D.C. §12-309 bars Hodges’s DCHRA unliquidated damages | Hodges concedes he did not provide the six-month written notice to the Mayor | District argues §12-309 bars unliquidated damages | Court: Summary judgment for District as to unliquidated DCHRA damages; liquidated remedies (back pay, attorney’s fees, other equitable relief) may proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard governs Rule 12(b)(6))
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (labels/conclusions insufficient; factual plausibility required)
- Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (pre-ADAAA restrictive interpretation of "substantially limits")
- Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (pre-ADAAA cases interpreting disability narrowly)
- McFadden v. Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, 611 F.3d 1 (DCHRA claims analyzed under ADA standards)
- Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110 (elements for disability discrimination claim)