Hocraffer v. Trotter General Contracting, Inc.
990 N.E.2d 390
Ill. App. Ct.2013Background
- Hocraffer sued Trotter for prevailing wage under 820 ILCS 130/1 et seq. for work allegedly performed in Trotter's shop.
- Trial court dismissed, holding IPWA applies only to on-site construction work; off-site shop work is not covered.
- Hocraffer amended to specify fabrication/assembly performed in shop and then transported to job sites for installation.
- Trotter argued IPWA Section 3 limits prevailing wage to workers directly employed on site, or transporting materials to the site.
- Court analyzed text of IPWA §3, concluding it covers only on-site workers and transport to/from site, not off-site fabrication.
- Court affirmed dismissal, holding off-site shop work is not subject to the Act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does IPWA §3 cover off-site shop fabrication? | Hocraffer contends the Act covers all work by the same workers for the project, including off-site shop work. | Trotter argues §3 limits prevailing wage to on-site construction and transportation to the site, excluding shop fabrication. | Off-site fabrication not covered; §3 applies only to on-site work and transport to site. |
| Is shop-produced fabrication within the Act because the workers perform the same tasks as on-site workers? | Hocraffer asserts the same workers perform the same tasks regardless of location, so wages should apply. | Trotter maintains off-site fabrication falls outside the statute's enumerated coverage. | Not within §3; off-site fabrication not required to receive prevailing wage. |
| Does the plain language of §3 permit off-site work to be governed by the Act? | Hocraffer urges broader interpretation consistent with the Act’s purpose to ensure fair wages. | Trotter urges strict construction limiting coverage to on-site and transport activities. | The language is unambiguous and excludes off-site fabrication from coverage. |
Key Cases Cited
- Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill. 2d 103 (2007) (statutory interpretation of plain meaning; legislative intent governs)
- Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455 (2000) (plain-language interpretation guiding statutory construction)
- In re Estate of Ellis, 236 Ill. 2d 45 (2009) (plain and ordinary meaning controls; extrinsic aids not needed)
- Poris v. Lake Holiday Property Owners Ass’n, 2013 IL 113907 (2013) (determinative of when intrinsic interpretation is adequate)
- Mattis v. State Universities Retirement System, 212 Ill. 2d 58 (2004) (when statute includes specific exclusions, interpret accordingly)
- Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Adelman, 215 Ill. App. 3d 561 (1991) (court construes statute as written; avoid adding provisions)