Hindman v. United States
131 Fed. Cl. 97
| Fed. Cl. | 2017Background
- Hindman was hired as a VA Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) on Jan 3, 2010; VA policy made LEOs eligible for group retention bonuses after completing training and 90 days of service.
- Hindman completed training and 90 days by ~Apr 1, 2010 but received no retention payments from Apr 10, 2010 through Nov 20, 2011.
- Hindman sought administrative EEO relief and then sued in the Court of Federal Claims (Feb 24, 2016) under the Back Pay Act for $8,160.20 in unpaid retention bonuses.
- Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Tucker Act) and failure to state a claim, arguing 5 U.S.C. § 5754 (retention bonuses) is discretionary and § 5305 (special pay) does not cover retention bonuses.
- The court examined statutory text, OPM regulations, and VA implementing policy and obtained VA documents showing the group retention authorization did not take effect until Nov 4–20, 2011, the first biweekly payment date for which Hindman began receiving bonuses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Court of Federal Claims has Tucker Act jurisdiction over Hindman’s Back Pay Act claim | Hindman: the Back Pay Act together with §§ 5754 and 5305 and implementing regs create a money‑mandating right to the unpaid retention bonus | United States: Back Pay Act is derivative; § 5754 is discretionary (uses "may") and § 5305 covers basic pay not retention bonuses | Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction — plaintiff failed to identify a money‑mandating source obligating payment |
| Whether 5 U.S.C. § 5305 mandates retention bonus payment | Hindman: § 5305 and 5 C.F.R. § 530.303 can be money‑mandating when conditions are met | United States: § 5305 governs special rates that are part of basic pay; retention bonuses are expressly not basic pay | Held: § 5305 does not apply to retention bonuses because those are not part of basic pay |
| Whether 5 U.S.C. § 5754 (retention bonus authority) is money‑mandating as applied | Hindman: § 5754 and VA/OPM regs/policy require payment when coverage conditions are met | United States: § 5754 and its regs use permissive language and leave payment/termination to agency discretion | Held: § 5754 is not money‑mandating here — OPM/regulatory and VA policy language confer discretion; no prior group authorization covered the disputed period |
| Whether Hindman adequately pleaded entitlement (service agreement / coverage) | Hindman: alleged completion of training and 90 days; written agreement not required where payment is biweekly | United States: complaint fails to allege the required written service agreement or the statutory exception; factual allegations insufficient | Held: Court did not reach merits because of lack of jurisdiction; factual showing failed to overcome statutory/regulatory discretion and VA authorization shows effective start date after disputed period |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (discusses Tucker Act jurisdictional nature)
- United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (statute must be money‑mandating to support Tucker Act claims)
- Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (well‑pleaded money‑mandating statute confers jurisdiction)
- Doe v. United States, 463 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (use of "may" creates presumption of discretion)
- Roberts v. United States, 745 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (statute + implementing rules/orders can be money‑mandating)
- Acevedo v. United States, 824 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (statute may be only money‑authorizing where agency discretion governs)
- Spagnola v. Stockman, 732 F.2d 908 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Back Pay Act is derivative)
- Connolly v. United States, 716 F.2d 882 (en banc) (Back Pay Act not itself jurisdictional)
- Worthington v. United States, 168 F.3d 24 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (example where Back Pay Act claim coupled with money‑mandating statute conferred jurisdiction)