Hillcrest Property, LLP v. Pasco County
915 F.3d 1292
11th Cir.2019Background
- Pasco County adopted Ordinance No. 11-15 to preserve transportation corridors and, as a condition of development approval, to require landowners adjacent to corridors to dedicate right-of-way equal to what the County deemed needed for future improvements. Dedications are limited to the land "needed for the planned transportation improvements," and the Ordinance provides waiver/compensation procedures and appeals.
- Hillcrest owns 16.5 acres fronting State Road 52. In permitting proceedings, the County demanded a 50-foot dedication, later increased to 140 feet (with County/FDOT compensation for the added 90 feet). Hillcrest revised plans to avoid building in the corridor and reserved its rights.
- Hillcrest did not pursue the Ordinance's administrative waiver procedures or state-court remedies; instead it sued in federal court, pleading multiple counts including a takings claim and facial and as-applied substantive-due-process claims. The takings claim was later dropped and ultimately settled for $4.7 million in a partial agreement that preserved the as-applied substantive-due-process claim.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for Hillcrest on the as-applied substantive-due-process claim and awarded nominal damages; the County appealed. A prior Eleventh Circuit panel vacated a separate facial ruling on statute-of-limitations grounds and left the as-applied claim open.
- The Eleventh Circuit (en banc precedent) reviewed whether unlawful application of a land-use ordinance can support a substantive-due-process claim and concluded that, under circuit precedent, an as-applied challenge to executive application of land-use law that does not implicate a fundamental right cannot succeed as a substantive-due-process claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether unlawful application of a land-use ordinance can state a substantive-due-process claim | Hillcrest: County applied Ordinance No. 11-15 coercively and arbitrarily (exaction without individualized proportionality) amounting to a substantive-due-process violation | County: Application was executive action to enforce a land-use ordinance and — absent infringement of a fundamental right — does not give rise to a substantive-due-process claim under Eleventh Circuit precedent | Held: No. As-applied challenge to executive application of land-use ordinance that does not implicate a fundamental right cannot support substantive due process; summary judgment for Hillcrest reversed |
| Whether land-use/property interests here are "fundamental" for substantive-due-process purposes | Hillcrest: Land-use exaction implicates core property rights and may be protected by substantive due process (also argued reliance on Nollan/Dolan/Koontz principles) | County: Land-use/property rights are state-created interests, not fundamental constitutional rights; they fall under state law/property or Takings Clause, not substantive due process | Held: Land-use rights are state-created property interests; Hillcrest did not allege a fundamental right, so heightened substantive-due-process protection does not apply |
| Whether Koontz/Nollan/Dolan allow substantive-due-process relief here | Hillcrest: Reliance on unconstitutional-conditions and exaction precedents to show County coerced dedication without proportionality | County: Those cases implicate the Takings Clause / unconstitutional-conditions doctrine (enumerated rights) and do not convert land-exaction claims into substantive-due-process claims | Held: Nollan/Dolan/Koontz are Takings/ unconstitutional-conditions authorities; they do not create a freestanding substantive-due-process remedy for state-created property rights when the claim is essentially an exaction/takings claim |
| Whether the legislative vs. executive distinction permits substantive-due-process protection | Hillcrest: County action resembles legislative or quasi-legislative misuse of police power to evade compensation and thus should be reviewable | County: Hillcrest’s as-applied challenge targets executive application/enforcement of the Ordinance (a discrete permitting decision), so McKinney’s legislative/executive distinction bars substantive-due-process relief | Held: The court reaffirmed McKinney: substantive due process may police arbitrary legislative action but not executive application of state-created rights absent infringement of a fundamental right; Hillcrest’s as-applied claim is executive and fails |
Key Cases Cited
- McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (executive acts do not give rise to substantive-due-process claims for state-created rights absent fundamental-right infringement)
- DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. County of DeKalb, 106 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (land-use rights are state-created property interests)
- Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. City of Mountain Brook, 345 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (non-legislative deprivations of state-created rights cannot support substantive due process)
- Kentner v. City of Sanibel, 750 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing facial legislative challenges from as-applied executive challenges for substantive due process)
- Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (property interests are defined by state law)
- Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (land-use exaction doctrine under the Takings Clause — essential nexus requirement)
- Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (land-use exaction doctrine under the Takings Clause — proportionality "roughly related" requirement)
- Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013) (unconstitutional-conditions doctrine applied in takings/exactions context)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (clarifying that challenges framed as regulatory takings must be analyzed under the Takings Clause)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (substantive-due-process review for executive action is cabined to only the most egregious official conduct)
- City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 538 U.S. 188 (2003) (declining substantive-due-process relief where executive conduct was not egregious)
- Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (distinguishing legislative development plans from executive application; eminent-domain context)