Hike v. State, 297 Neb. 212

The State condemned 1.05 acres of the Hikes’ property for Highway 75; a jury verdict on compensation was later affirmed on appeal (Hike I).
During construction in August 2011, heavy machinery caused structural damage to the Hikes’ house, which the Hikes’ experts valued at about $51,829.
The trial court excluded evidence of that post-taking structural damage from the condemnation trial as not proximately caused by the taking.
The Hikes appealed that evidentiary ruling in Hike I; the Supreme Court affirmed exclusion on the ground the damage occurred after the taking and was not proximate to it.
The Hikes later (April 17, 2015) filed a separate inverse condemnation action against the State seeking compensation for the structural damage; the State moved for summary judgment asserting a 2-year statute of limitations defense under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-218.
The district court granted summary judgment for the State as time-barred; the Supreme Court affirmed, holding § 25-218 governs inverse condemnation claims against the State and the Hikes’ claim accrued in August 2011.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State is judicially estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense	State previously argued the Hikes should bring a separate action; estoppel should prevent a contrary limitation defense	State’s earlier position related to evidentiary admissibility, not waiver of defenses; no bad faith or intent to mislead	No estoppel; State may assert § 25-218 defense
Which statute of limitations applies to inverse condemnation against the State	§ 25-202 (10-year) is the more appropriate/analogous statute for land-related claims	§ 25-218 (2-year) specifically governs claims against the State and therefore controls	§ 25-218 (2-year) applies to inverse condemnation claims against the State
When did the Hikes’ inverse-condemnation claim accrue / did they bring the action within the statute	Claim was asserted in Hike I and thus brought within 2 years	Claim accrued in August 2011 when damage occurred; separate inverse-condemnation suit must be filed—Hikes filed in 2015	Accrual in August 2011; Hikes did not bring timely suit (filed 2015); claim barred
Whether the constitutional self-executing nature of art. I, § 21 precludes application of § 25-218	Constitutional right to just compensation is self-executing and should not be time-barred by § 25-218	Argument not properly preserved/assigned on appeal; procedural/default issue	Court refused to consider the unassigned constitutional argument

Hike v. State, 288 Neb. 60 (2014) (prior appeal affirming exclusion of post-taking damage evidence)
Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion, 286 Neb. 322 (2013) (definition/principles of eminent domain)
Bordy v. State, 142 Neb. 714 (1943) (applying § 25-218 to suits against the State for takings/damages)
Czarnick v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 190 Neb. 521 (1973) (applying § 25-218 in State-related takings context)
Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198 Neb. 608 (1977) (holding § 25-202 applicable to inverse-condemnation claims not brought against the State)
Steuben v. City of Lincoln, 249 Neb. 270 (1996) (applying 10-year general statute for inverse-condemnation claims against local government)
Sports Courts of Omaha v. Meginnis, 242 Neb. 768 (1993) (rule on trial-court jurisdiction while appeal pending; explains exceptions)