Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, Ohio
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22059
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- Hidden Village owns an apartment complex in Lakewood where Lutheran Metropolitan Ministries’ Youth Re-Entry Program (predominantly Black clients) leased units beginning in 2006.
- Lakewood officials (Building Commissioner Barrett, Mayor George, and Administrator Fitzgerald) challenged the program’s presence as a zoning/institutional use; the Planning Commission later reversed the zoning order.
- After the reversal, city actors engaged in a series of actions: police memos directing citations of program members, repeated citations/arrests of participants, threatening letters from the mayor, and an unannounced "joint inspection" (police, SWAT attire, canine unit, fire and health inspectors) that targeted buildings housing program members.
- Hidden Village sued the city and individual officials under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983 and the Fair Housing Act (§ 3617), alleging racially motivated harassment aimed at driving out Black tenants; it also asserted an Ohio trespass claim based on the joint inspection.
- The district court denied defendants’ summary-judgment motions (including qualified immunity and state-immunity defenses); the officials appealed interlocutorily, raising qualified immunity and state-immunity defenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qualified immunity for individual defendants on § 1981/§ 1982/§ 1983 claims | Officials engaged in concerted, race-motivated campaign that violated tenants' federal rights, so immunity is not available | Officials deny race-based action; claim qualified immunity shields them from suit | Denied: factual record permits a jury to find race-motivated conduct, so immunity improper at summary judgment |
| Municipal liability (Monell) | City policies/customs (emails, coordinated actions, inspections) caused the violations | City argues no constitutional/statutory violation occurred | The court exercised pendent jurisdiction and allowed § 1981/§ 1982/§ 1983 claims against Lakewood to proceed to trial because factual dispute on discrimination exists |
| Fair Housing Act (§ 3617) scope — must § 3603–3606 also be violated? | § 3617 independently prohibits coercion/intimidation for aiding/exercising fair-housing rights; it applies even without a separate § 3604 violation | § 3617 requires a predicate violation of §§ 3603–3606; individual officials entitled to qualified immunity because law not clearly established | Mixed: City can be sued under § 3617, but individual defendants get qualified immunity because, at the time (2006–07), controlling authority was not clearly to the plaintiff's side |
| Third-party/standing concerns for landlord pursing tenants’ rights | Landlord (Hidden Village) can vindicate tenants' rights where government action irrationally restricts landlord's property rights | Defendants raised prudential standing concerns | Rejected: Fourteenth Amendment and precedent (Buchanan) permit landlords to sue; defendants abandoned standing challenge to §§ 1981–1982 on appeal |
| Ohio state-law immunity for trespass claim | Joint inspection was a willful, malicious act aimed to harass and drive out tenants; exception to immunity applies | Officials claim Ohio statutory immunity and inspection privilege shield them | Denied: a jury could find malicious purpose under Ohio law, so state immunity is not available at summary judgment; privilege defense not reviewable on interlocutory appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (establishes federal qualified-immunity framework)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires a policy or custom)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable collateral order)
- Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (landlord has standing to challenge government racial restrictions on occupancy)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (qualified-immunity standard: clearly established law requirement)
- Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. en banc interprets § 3617 broadly; post-dates the conduct here)
- Michigan Prot. & Advocacy Serv. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337 (left open scope of § 3617; circuit precedent referenced)
- Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. decisions informing split of authority on § 3617)