640 S.W.3d 232
Tex. Crim. App.2022Background
- Applicant Ray Anthony Hicks was originally charged with third-degree felony forgery but pled guilty to the lesser-included attempted forgery offense and received a six-month state-jail sentence.
- The habeas application raised only an “actual innocence” claim: whether newly-discovered evidence shows, by clear and convincing evidence, he did not commit the attempted forgery to which he pled guilty.
- Hicks did not allege his guilty plea was involuntary in his pro se application; counsel later amended the application but still did not assert involuntariness.
- The majority invoked Ex parte Mable sua sponte to grant relief, treating the case like one where a later forensic finding negated an element of the charged offense.
- Judge Yeary dissented: he argued Mable is inapplicable and distinguishable because Hicks pled only to attempt (and there is evidence he believed the bill was forged), and that the court should not raise new claims for a represented applicant.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether applicant is actually innocent of the attempted forgery to which he pled | Hicks: newly-discovered evidence undermines the offense and shows actual innocence | State: evidence shows Hicks believed the bill was forged and committed attempted forgery; applicant did not plead involuntariness | Majority granted relief (applying Mable); dissent would deny relief |
| Whether Ex parte Mable applies to a plea to an attempt offense | Hicks (implicitly): Mable-type relief is appropriate when evidence negates an element related to the offense | State/dissent: Mable addressed a completed offense; here the plea was to attempt, supported by admissions, so Mable is distinguishable | Dissent: Mable inapplicable; majority treated it as controlling |
| Whether the court may and should raise a voluntariness claim sua sponte for a represented applicant | Hicks: did not raise involuntariness; no explicit argument presented | Dissent/state: courts should not create claims sua sponte for represented applicants; petitioner never alleged he would have insisted on trial | Dissent would deny relief and criticizes sua sponte action; majority nonetheless invoked the issue |
| Whether, even if Mable applied, the plea would be involuntary because applicant would not have pled had he known the bill was genuine | Hicks: (implicit) plea involuntary if underlying factual basis was false | State/dissent: applicant received substantial benefit (reduced penalty); no allegation he would have insisted on trial; therefore plea likely voluntary | Dissent: would not be convinced applicant would have rejected the plea; would deny relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Mable, 443 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (held a guilty plea was involuntary when later testing showed the substance was not controlled)
- Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (defines post-conviction "actual innocence" standard)
- Ex parte Carter, 521 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (courts may not create claims sua sponte that are not arguably present in an applicant’s pleadings)
- Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (plea-benefit often undermines claims that a plea would not have been entered but for false evidence)
- Ex parte Navarijo, 433 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (this Court is the ultimate factfinder in post-conviction habeas proceedings)