Hexcel Corporation v. Ineos Polymers, Inc.
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11071
| 9th Cir. | 2012Background
- Hexcel sued Ineos Polymers (BP Amoco) in 2008 for antitrust injuries from a carbon-fiber price-fixing scheme alleged to have begun in 1992.
- Hexcel sought tolling of the four-year statute of limitations under fraudulent concealment, arguing it did not discover its claims until February 2001 after its internal investigation.
- Hexcel had substantial prior awareness of anticompetitive conduct in the industry, including a January 1999 DOJ grand jury subpoena naming Hexcel and others.
- Hexcel publicly disclosed in a March 30, 1999 Form 10-K that it was subject to a federal grand jury investigation into carbon fiber pricing.
- BP Amoco terminated a tolling agreement on September 12, 2008, with the district court calculating accrual as April 10, 1999, for purposes of the limitations period.
- The district court granted summary judgment against Hexcel in October 2010, determining Hexcel had actual or constructive notice by April 10, 1999; the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did fraudulent concealment toll the limitations period? | Hexcel contends concealment delayed accrual until 2001. | BP Amoco argues accrual occurred earlier; concealment cannot toll the period. | Fraudulent concealment tolling not sufficient; accrual occurred by April 10, 1999. |
| Did Hexcel have actual or constructive knowledge before April 10, 1999? | Hexcel argues lack of knowledge before 2001 due to concealment. | BP Amoco asserts knowledge existed earlier based on interactions and disclosures. | Substantial evidence showed constructive or actual knowledge well before April 10, 1999. |
| Did the January 29, 1999 DOJ subpoena trigger inquiry notice sufficient to start the statute? | Subpoena did not alert Hexcel to claims; inquiry notice insufficient. | Subpoena plus prior red flags should have alerted for diligent inquiry. | Yes; the subpoena and preceding red flags triggered notice. |
| Was summary judgment appropriate given the record on notice? | Disputes existed as to Hexcel's knowledge; material facts unresolved. | Evidence viewed in light most favorable to Hexcel still supports notice. | No genuine issues; summary judgment was proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., 858 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1988) (fraudulent concealment requires actual or constructive knowledge with diligence)
- Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1978) (notice and diligence tolling considerations in repeated suits)
- Volk v. D.A. Davidson Co., 816 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987) (annual report can provide constructive notice of claims)
- Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1784 (S. Ct. 2010) (discovery rule concepts distinguished from fraudulent concealment)
- GO Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2007) (inquiry notice standard for constructive knowledge in limitations)
- TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1999) (discovery rule concepts in federal common law)
- Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1988) (discovery rule related to antitrust discovery not requiring actual discovery)