606 U.S. 419
U.S.2025Background
- Before the First Step Act (2018), first-time offenders convicted under 18 U.S.C. §924(c) were subject to "stacked" mandatory 25-year sentences for each count beyond the first, leading to extremely long sentences.
- Petitioners Hewitt, Duffey, and Ross were convicted in 2009 of multiple §924(c) offenses tied to bank robberies, resulting in sentences exceeding 325 years.
- After initial appeals, some convictions and sentences were vacated and new sentences of 285–305 years were imposed in 2012.
- The Supreme Court’s 2019 Davis ruling invalidated the "crime of violence" definition for some §924(c) convictions, triggering further postconviction challenges and leading to vacatur of additional convictions and all sentences.
- At resentencing (post–First Step Act), the petitioners argued the Act's more lenient non-stacking penalties applied; the district court disagreed, reimposing long stacked sentences. The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's approach, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §403(b) of the First Step Act apply to §924(c) offenders whose prior sentences were vacated post-Act? | Vacated sentence means no sentence has been imposed—Act’s lenient penalties apply at resentencing. | Once sentenced (even if vacated), Act's retroactivity does not apply; harsher penalties apply. | Yes—First Step Act applies; vacated sentences are void, so lenient penalties apply at resentencing. |
| How to interpret "has not been imposed" in §403(b): present-perfect vs. past-perfect? | Present-perfect requires an extant (not vacated) sentence at resentencing. | Historical fact of any sentence imposed, regardless of vacatur, triggers the old penalties. | Present-perfect requires a valid, current sentence; vacated means none imposed for Act purposes. |
| Effect of legal vacatur: Does a vacated sentence have any continued effect for retroactivity? | Vacatur erases legal effect of prior sentence, making the defendant eligible for Act relief. | Vacated sentences remain historical facts, so defendant remains ineligible for Act benefit. | Vacated sentences are treated as never imposed; thus, Act's retroactivity applies. |
| Policy intent of §403(b) retroactivity: Should congressional purpose affect breadth of retroactivity? | Congress intended to end unduly harsh stacking for all pending/resentenced defendants. | Congress only intended limited retroactivity for those un-sentenced as of Act's passage. | Legislative context supports broader application to all first-time offenders pending sentencing/resignation. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019) (invalidated residual clause definition of "crime of violence" in §924(c), impacting prior convictions)
- Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) (interpreted §924(c) to require consecutive stacking of penalties for each count)
- Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980) (discussed the effect of vacated prior convictions for subsequent federal prosecutions)
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (explained that vacatur nullifies prior conviction/sentence)
- Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) (discussed plenary resentencing upon vacation of some counts in multi-count cases)