Heusser v. Hale
777 F. Supp. 2d 366
D. Conn.2011Background
- Plaintiffs Franklyn Heusser, Sr., Franklyn Heusser, Jr., and Frank's LLC sue Hale and the City of Ansonia over removal from and alleged discriminatory denial to reinstate Frank's Service Station on Ansonia's Rotational Tow List (RTL).
- Hale, as Ansonia's Chief of Police, oversees the RTL and allegedly has sole discretion to determine who is on the RTL.
- Frank's Service Station was removed from the RTL on September 20, 2007 following the arrest of Heusser, Sr. and Jr., which Plaintiffs claim was retaliatory.
- Frank's LLC applied to join the RTL but was denied without explanation; Plaintiffs allege this denial was discriminatory and retaliatory.
- Plaintiffs filed a federal action in 2007 alleging First Amendment retaliation and related claims; the case was amended to add the City of Ansonia and Frank's LLC as parties, and the misdemeanor charges against Plaintiffs were later reduced to infractions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Counts One and Two state First Amendment retaliation claims. | Heussers contend retaliation for speech. | Defendants contend speech was not on a matter of public concern. | Counts One and Two dismissed for lack of public-concern speech. |
| Whether Counts Three and Four plead valid Equal Protection class-of-one claims. | Plaintiffs allege treatment different from others similarly situated. | Engquist bars class-of-one claims in public employment; acts are discretionary. | Counts Three and Four dismissed as Engquist bar on class-of-one claims. |
| Whether Count Nine plead a valid Equal Protection selective-enforcement claim. | Frank's LLC was treated differently from RTL peers. | Engquist bars; also lack of sufficient pleading of 'similarly situated' individuals. | Count Nine dismissed; Engquist bars and Iqbal pleading inadequate. |
| Whether Counts Three, Four, and Nine can be pursued under a selective-enforcement theory separate from First Amendment claims. | Selective-enforcement theory provides independent Equal Protection claims. | Coalesces with flawed First Amendment claims; fails as a matter of law. | All selective-enforcement theories fail; Counts Three, Four, Nine dismissed. |
| Whether the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing federal claims. | State-law claims remain proper if related to federal claims. | If federal claims are dismissed, court should decline supplemental jurisdiction. | State-law claims dismissed without prejudice; court declines supplemental jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (U.S. 1983) (speech addressed in public concern depends on content and context)
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2006) (official-duty speech not protected; public-employee speech analysis)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (U.S. 2008) (class-of-one claims barred in public employment context)
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (U.S. 2000) (establishes 'class-of-one' concept in equal protection)
- Massi v. Flynn, 353 F. App’x 658 (2d Cir. 2009) (Engquist bars class-of-one in public employment; malicious intent claims insufficient)
- Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2008) (motive as a factor, not dispositive, in matter-of-public-concern analysis)
- White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993) (public-employee speech implicated as matter of public concern; towing arrangement context)
- Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (selective enforcement claims may coalesce with retaliation claims)