Guy MASSI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward FLYNN, individually and as Chief of Police of the Village of Mamaroneck, Robert Holland, as a member of the Police Department, Philip Trifiletti, as Mayor of The Village of Mamaroneck, William J. Paonessa, Trusteе, Anthony Vozza, Trustee, Christie Derrico, Trustee, Joseph Angiletta, Trustee, The Village Of Mamaroneck, New York, Defendаnts-Appellees, John O‘Riley, as Village Attorney of the Village of Mamaroneck, Defendant.
No. 08-5588-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Nov. 24, 2009.
353 F. Appx. 658
We have considered each of Ricioppo‘s arguments on appeal and, substantially for the reasons stated in the District Court‘s thorough, well-reasoned order of March 4, 2009, we find them to be withоut merit.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
Joseph A. Maria, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Joseph A. Saccomano, Jr., Jackson Lewis LLP, White Plains, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
PRESENT: ROGER J. MINER, JOSÉ A. CABRANES and CHESTER J. STRAUB, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
We review de novo the District Court‘s decision to dismiss a suit on a motion under
Massi does not assert a “standаrd” equal protection claim—that he was treated differently than other similarly situated employees based on his membership in a specific protected class. Rather, he claims that he is a “class of one” who was treated maliciously due to his alleged post-traumatic stress disorder and his failure to cooperate with Flynn‘s investigation of another police officer. As noted by the District Court, Massi‘s equal protection claim is barred by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Engquist v. Or. Dep‘t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008), which overruled Second Circuit precedent that had recognized “class of one” equal protection claims. In Engquist, the Supreme Court held that a public employee does not state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause unless he alleges that he was treated differently based on his membership in a pаrticular class. 128 S.Ct. at 2156 (“[If] plaintiffs need not claim discrimination on the basis of membership in some class or group, but rather mаy argue only that they were treated by their employers worse than other employees similarly situated, any personnel action in which a wronged employee can conjure up a claim of differential treatment will suddenly become the basis for a federal constitutional claim.“). Because Massi claims only that he was treated differently from other similarly situated employees for malicious reasons or due to his alleged psychologiсal injury and failure to cooperate with Flynn‘s investigation of another police officer, and not on the bаsis of his membership in any particular class, his equal protection claim is barred by Engquist.
Massi also argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his due process claim because (1) he did not timely receive a hearing when seeking disability benefits under
In sum, we have considered each of plaintiff‘s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
