1:20-cv-00205
D. IdahoJan 7, 2021Background:
- Plaintiffs challenged Idaho COVID-19 public-health orders as violating multiple federal and state constitutional provisions and RLUIPA, focusing chiefly on early orders that prohibited in-person religious gatherings and restricted interstate travel.
- The Director issued a statewide Stay Home Order in late March 2020 that barred religious gatherings and nonessential travel; later guidance and Stay Healthy Orders (beginning May 1) progressively lifted those specific prohibitions and permitted in-person worship with distancing.
- By mid-May the complained-of gathering and travel restrictions had been removed; subsequent Stay Healthy Orders (including Orders 4 and 5) continued to exempt religious activities even when other restrictions were tightened.
- Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint asserting injunctive and declaratory relief but did not seek emergency relief such as a TRO; Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction/mootness.
- The Court concluded the challenged restrictions were no longer in effect, that their reimposition was speculative and unlikely, and that mootness (including voluntary cessation and capable-of-repetition exceptions) did not preserve jurisdiction.
- Result: Motion to dismiss granted; case dismissed without prejudice (Plaintiffs may refile if restrictions are reimposed).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III jurisdiction / mootness | Ongoing injury from threat that orders can be reimposed (boilerplate language gives continuing harm) | Challenged prohibitions were rescinded; no live controversy exists | Case is moot; dismissal without prejudice |
| Speculative future injury / reimposition | Pandemic conditions and order language make reimposition likely | Speculation is insufficient; past conduct alone does not sustain relief | Speculation insufficient to avoid mootness |
| Voluntary cessation exception | Defendants could resume restrictions once pressure eases | Changes were not driven by this litigation and defendants met burden to show nonrecurrence | Exception does not apply; voluntary cessation moots case |
| "Capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception | Pandemic restrictions are recurring and short-lived, so exception should apply | Plaintiffs cannot show reasonable expectation they will face same action again | Exception not met; no reasonable expectation of repetition |
Key Cases Cited
- Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (Article III requires a live controversy)
- All. for the Wild Rockies v. Savage, 897 F.3d 1025 (mootness requires a live controversy throughout litigation)
- United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (case or controversy ends when matter becomes moot)
- Dufresne v. Veneman, 114 F.3d 952 (speculative future government conduct insufficient to avoid mootness)
- Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423 (speculative contingencies do not sustain injunctive relief)
- Spell v. Edwards, 962 F.3d 175 (expired pandemic orders mooted injunction claims)
- City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (past exposure to illegal conduct alone cannot support injunctive relief)
- Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (voluntary cessation mootness test)
- United States v. Brandau, 578 F.3d 1064 (voluntary cessation doctrine explained)
- Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (standards for "capable of repetition, yet evading review")
