Hernandez v. Peery, 20-6199

Background

In 2006 Townley was tried for attempted murder; a codefendant (Noe Flores) gave a signed declaration describing the shooting that the prosecution planned to use at trial.
The trial court sealed Flores’s declaration and barred Townley’s counsel from discussing the existence or contents of the declaration with Townley, investigators, or other attorneys, permitting its use only for cross‑examination.
Flores testified for the prosecution; Townley was convicted and sentenced to consecutive life and 25‑to‑life terms.
The California Court of Appeal reversed under Geders/Perry (automatic reversal for unjustified interference with attorney–client communication); the California Supreme Court accepted the interference but held it was not structural error and remanded to assess prejudice under Strickland.
On remand the Court of Appeal found no prejudice and affirmed; Townley’s federal §2254 petition was denied, and the Ninth Circuit refused a certificate of appealability (COA).
Justice Sotomayor dissented from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, arguing the Ninth Circuit erred in denying a COA because reasonable jurists could debate whether Geders/Perry require automatic reversal rather than a Strickland prejudice showing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Townley)	Defendant's Argument (State / CA Supreme Court)	Held (Justice Sotomayor, dissent)
Whether an unjustified court order barring counsel from discussing a key prosecution declaration with the defendant is structural error requiring automatic reversal	The order unjustifiably interfered with Sixth Amendment right to counsel; under Geders and Perry automatic reversal is required (no prejudice showing)	The interference was conceded but not structural; Strickland prejudice must be shown because the restriction was limited and did not prevent meaningful adversarial testing	Geders/Perry control; automatic reversal is appropriate for unjustified interference—requiring prejudice conflicts with Geders/Perry
Applicability of Strickland/Cronic to access‑to‑counsel interference claims	Strickland (actual ineffectiveness) is inapposite; direct government interference presumes prejudice	The CA Supreme Court applied Strickland and Cronic to require a reasonable‑probability showing of prejudice	Strickland does not govern direct interference claims; Cronic and Geders support presuming prejudice in such circumstances
Whether the specific restriction (no discussion of a sealed declaration) was materially smaller than the Geders facts and thus not structural	The total prohibition on discussing a crucial document about a key witness effectively prevented counsel from performing essential functions	The restriction was limited (only a few documents) and not comparable in magnitude to Geders’ multi‑hour ban on communication	Reasonable jurists could debate whether a blanket ban on discussing a key prosecution document is as prejudicial as the Geders scenario; the issue is reasonably debatable
Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in denying a COA under AEDPA (§2253)	Reasonable jurists could debate whether the CA Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, so a COA should issue	The Ninth Circuit concluded Townley failed to make a substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right and denied a COA	Sotomayor would grant certiorari and reverse the Ninth Circuit’s denial of a COA because the claim is reasonably debatable

Key Cases Cited

Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (court‑ordered prohibition on defendant–counsel communication during a recess violated Sixth Amendment; conviction reversed)
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (reiterated that Geders requires reversal without inquiry into actual prejudice for unjustified denial of counsel access)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance claims requires showing of prejudice)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (presumed prejudice where counsel is prevented from assisting at a critical stage)
Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (COA stage does not require petitioner to show some jurists would grant relief; claim must be reasonably debatable)
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (standard for issuing a COA: reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s resolution)
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (COA required to appeal denial of a §2254 habeas petition)
Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. _ (at COA stage, inquiry is whether claim is reasonably debatable)